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PRICING DRUGS FAIRLY

GOVIND PERSAD*
ABSTRACT
Dissatisfaction with drug prices has prompted a flurry of recent
legislation and academic research. But while pharmaceutical policy
often regards fair pricing as a goal, the concept of fairness itself
frequently goes undefined. Legal scholarship—even work ostensibly
focused on fairness—has not defined and defended an account of fair
pricing. Recent legislative proposals in the House and Senate have
similarly avoided a determinate position on fairness. This Article
explains and defends an account of what makes a price for a drug
fair (identifying fair price with social value), argues for implementing fair pricing through a price ceiling grounded in social value, and
examines how the proposed price ceiling could overcome legal and
political obstacles. By focusing on fairness, this Article pursues a
goal that complements, rather than duplicates, recent legal scholarship on pharmaceutical pricing.
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This Article makes three contributions. First, it identifies, makes
explicit, and categorizes the most prominent conceptions of fairness
in drug pricing. Second, it advances an account of fair pricing that
centers on a drug’s value to society. Third, it proposes the implementation of fair pricing via a price ceiling that ensures that the price of
a drug does not exceed its value to society and explains how this
price-ceiling approach would address a variety of legal and political
obstacles.
In Part I, the Article categorizes conceptions of fair pricing. It first
considers procedural fairness and critically evaluates the view that
any price reached in a procedurally fair negotiation is substantively
fair. It then reviews four comparators used for assessing substantive
fairness: (a) the cost of developing the drug, (b) the drug’s affordability to patients, (c) the drug’s customary price, and (d) the drug’s
social value. Part I concludes that social value should be used to
identify when a price is unfair, although the other factors can
indicate procedural unfairness or serve to justify other policies, such
as subsidized insurance. Part II then takes on the task of defining
social value. It explains how cost-effectiveness analysis could be used
to define social value and argues that cost-effectiveness analysis
should be modified to incorporate factors other than overall costs and
health benefits, such as fairness to patients with preexisting disabilities and reduction of health disparities. However, this analysis
should not be modified to provide greater incentives to treat rare
diseases or diseases lacking other treatments.
Part III turns to implementation, arguing that fair pricing can
best be achieved through a price ceiling that tracks social value. It
explains how such a price ceiling could incentivize the production of
socially valuable treatments and describes the legal, ethical, and
political advantages of price ceilings over other options, such as
reimbursement ceilings. In particular, the availability of treatments
whose price exceeds the reimbursement ceiling will lead to administrators enforcing the reimbursement ceiling taking the blame when
patients die or suffer illness. In contrast, while price ceilings may
discourage the development of costly drugs, they do not require
payers to reject identifiable patients who could benefit from existing
treatments or families to refuse those treatments. Price ceilings also
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avoid the legal limitations that private and public insurers face when
they attempt to deny coverage for expensive treatments.
Part IV identifies potential legal obstacles to the implementation
of a price ceiling and explains how to avoid them. Some obstacles,
like preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause, apply only to
state-level efforts. Other obstacles, such as the Takings Clause and
a potential revival of Lochner-era freedom of contract, also apply to
federal initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
A new gene therapy for spinal muscular atrophy, Zolgensma, was
recently priced at over $2 million per treatment.1 Insulin prices
have tripled between 2002 and 2013, with some patients paying
more than $1000 per month.2 Are these prices fair? If not, what
should we do about it? While pharmaceutical policy often regards
fair pricing as a goal, the concept of fairness itself frequently goes
undefined. This Article explains and defends an account of what
makes a price for a drug fair that identifies fair price with social
value, argues for implementing fair pricing through a price ceiling
grounded in social value, and examines how the proposed price
ceiling could overcome legal and political obstacles.
By focusing on fairness, this Article pursues a goal that complements, rather than duplicates, recent legal scholarship on
pharmaceutical pricing. Since the early 2000s, legal and political
obstacles have stymied efforts to regulate drug prices. Washington,
D.C.’s regulatory effort to cap the prices of patented drugs was
found to be preempted by federal patent law,3 while the recent
Maryland drug price regulations were struck down on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds.4 Much scholarship on domestic drug
pricing has focused on specific legal obstacles to price regulation,
such as patent preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause, takings
challenges, or void-for-vagueness challenges.5 Other scholarship
1. Peter B. Bach, ‘Anchoring’ Was at Work in Setting the Price of Novartis’ New Gene
Therapy, STAT NEWS (June 4, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/04/anchoring-pricezolgensma/ [https://perma.cc/T5EN-TCF2].
2. Megan Thielking, Protesters Take Anger over Insulin Prices to Drug Makers, Some
Bearing Children’s Ashes, STAT NEWS (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/12/
protest-insulin-prices-sanofi-mothers-bring-children-ashes/ [https://perma.cc/5JWY-KKWX].
3. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
4. Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
5. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in
“Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (2020) (discussing
void-for-vagueness challenges); Robin Feldman, Betty Chang Rowe, Rabiah Oral, Amy Y. Gu
& Katherine Gudiksen, The Patent Act and the Constitutionality of State Pharmaceutical
Regulation, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 40, 41 (2019) (discussing preemption and
takings challenges); AARON BERMAN, THEODORE LEE, ADAM PAN, ZAIN RIZVI & ARIELLE
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has searched for innovative legal avenues, such as antitrust or
human rights law, to rein in prices.6
Despite popular, legislative, and academic dissatisfaction with
drug prices, legal scholarship—even when ostensibly focused on
fairness—has not defined and defended a specific account of fair
pricing.7 Recent legislative proposals either pass the buck on
defining fairness by indexing the desired price to international drug
prices or to inflation or use a catch-all approach that includes
almost every plausible criterion for fairness.8 Defining a fair price
would help to enrich the burgeoning discussion around drug pricing.
It could also help forestall the “drunkard’s search” problem, when
fundamental policy goals are determined by what seems achievable
rather than by what is actually desirable.9 And it could also help
head off void-for-vagueness challenges.10

THOMAS, YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUST. P’SHIP, CURBING UNFAIR DRUG PRICES: A PRIMER FOR
STATES 12 (2017), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/
curbing_unfair_drug_prices-policy_paper-080717.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRN4-XHW7]
(discussing preemption); Christopher Robertson, Will Courts Allow States to Regulate Drug
Prices?, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1000, 1000 (2018) (discussing the Dormant Commerce Clause).
6. See, e.g., Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing as an Antitrust Violation, 82 ANTITRUST
L.J. 701, 705 (2019); Kwanghyuk Yoo, Interaction of Human Rights Law and Competition
Law: The Right to Access to Medicines and Consumer Welfare in the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Sector, 43 VT. L. REV. 123, 124-26 (2018).
7. See, e.g., Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 863 (noting the “deeper normative questions
about what constitutes ‘fair’ pricing and how it should be evaluated,” but not attempting to
answer those questions); First, supra note 6, at 706; BERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 4
(asserting that “[u]nfair drug pricing represents a particularly egregious problem,” but not
defining what constitutes a fair price).
8. See Billy Wynne & Alyssa Llamas, New Legislation to Control Drug Prices: How Do
House and Senate Bills Compare? An Update, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2020/new-legislation-control-drug-prices-how-dohouse-and-senate-bills-compare-update [https://perma.cc/E9HX-N3FN] (discussing the
House’s Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act and the Senate’s Prescription Drug
Pricing Reduction Act of 2019); Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 870 & n.66 (discussing the
Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, which permits the classification of a drug as
“excessively priced” based on its price exceeding the price charged in other developed
countries, its price being incommensurate with its cost of development or its health benefits,
or “[o]ther factors the Secretary determines appropriate” (quoting Prescription Drug Price
Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(H) (2019) (alteration in original))).
9. See ROBERT JERVIS, HOW STATESMEN THINK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 40-60 (2017) (defining the drunkard’s search problem).
10. Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 905 (asserting that clarifying the standards for
“unreasonableness” could help avoid vagueness challenges).
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This Article makes three contributions. First, it identifies, makes
explicit, and categorizes the most prominent conceptions of fairness
in drug pricing. Second, it advances an account of fair pricing that
centers on a drug’s value to society. Third, it proposes the implementation of fair pricing via a price ceiling that ensures that the
price of a drug does not exceed its value to society, and it explains
how this price-ceiling approach would address a variety of legal and
political obstacles.
While this Article connects its contributions to one another, they
are separable. Even those who reject its account of fair pricing
should find the taxonomy offered in Part I useful. And Part II.D’s
proposal to define fair pricing in terms of social value could be
implemented in other ways than the price ceiling the Article
proposes. Conversely, the price-ceiling approach explained in Part
III could be used to implement an account of fair pricing that
defines social value differently from the Article’s proposal or does
not base pricing on social value.
In Part I, the Article categorizes conceptions of fair pricing. It
first considers procedural fairness and critically evaluates the view
that any price reached in a procedurally fair negotiation is substantively fair. It then reviews four comparators used for assessing
substantive fairness: (a) the cost of developing the drug, (b) the
drug’s affordability to patients, (c) the drug’s customary price, and
(d) the drug’s social value. Part I concludes that social value should
be used to identify when a price is unfair, although the other factors
can indicate procedural unfairness or serve to justify other policies,
such as subsidized insurance.
Part II takes on the task of defining social value. It explains how
cost-effectiveness analysis could be used to define social value and
considers whether to modify cost-effectiveness analysis to incorporate factors other than cost and health benefits. Part III then
defends the use of a price ceiling—a limit on the price that any
purchaser can be charged—that tracks social value. It explains how
such a price ceiling could incentivize the production of socially
valuable treatments, and it describes the legal, ethical, and political
advantages of price ceilings over other options such as reimbursement ceilings that limit the price specific purchasers will pay for
drugs. In particular, the availability of treatments whose price
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exceeds the reimbursement ceiling subject administrators enforcing
the reimbursement ceiling to blame when patients die or suffer
illnesses. In contrast, while price ceilings may discourage the
development of costly drugs, they do not require payers to refuse to
reimburse identifiable patients who could benefit from existing
treatments.
Part IV identifies potential legal obstacles to a price ceiling and
explains how to avoid them. Some obstacles, such as preemption
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, apply only to state-level efforts.
Other obstacles, such as the Takings Clause and a potential revival
of Lochner-era freedom of contract, also apply to federal initiatives.
I. WHAT IS A FAIR PRICE FOR A DRUG?
In this Part, I categorize and present a variety of approaches to
fair pharmaceutical pricing and defend an approach grounded in
social value. While legal scholarship has often raised the question
of what a fair price is for a drug, there has not yet been a comprehensive attempt to address it. This Part fills that gap.
I first consider and reject as inadequate the view that a fair price
is the price that a drug would command in a competitive market.
Even if this approach is normatively compelling, pharmaceutical
markets deviate from ideal competition in a way that makes it
inapplicable. I then review the four most prominent approaches to
defining a fair price for goods in markets that deviate from ideal
competition, which I call the cost, affordability, custom, and social
value approaches.
A. Procedural Fairness
1. Is Procedural Fairness Sufficient for a Price to Be Fair?
For most goods and services, modern market societies regard the
prevailing price in a competitive market as fair.11 Courts similarly
11. See NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE 18 (Norman R. Augustine, Guru Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass eds., 2018),
https://www.nap.edu/read/24946/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/N9G8-AZ5Q] [hereinafter NAM
REPORT] (“In the United States, market forces are generally considered to be the most
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often equate fair prices with market prices.12 This approach makes
fair pricing an application of what John Rawls famously called “pure
procedural justice,” under which an outcome’s origin in a fair
process establishes its fairness.13
Unconscionability doctrine is the branch of law that has most
closely examined whether fairness is purely procedural. Many legal
systems historically regarded nonprocedural factors as relevant to
fair pricing: such factors included the seller’s labor investment, the
community’s view of reasonableness, and the prices other buyers
pay for similar goods.14 Modern contract law, in contrast, generally
restricts itself to procedural considerations.15 As Ian Ayres observes,
“[c]ontracts are almost never struck down for unconscionable price
terms,”16 and the black letter rule is that “courts do not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration.”17
Notwithstanding this black letter rule, modern courts do sometimes question and reform prices in contracts.18 Often, court intervention is motivated by procedural concerns: while some equate
economically efficient way of determining what goods are provided and at what price.”);
Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory), 76 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 69 (2013) (“explain[ing] why the fair price is represented as the
competitive market price”).
12. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396
(1906) (discussing the “market or fair price” that would have been paid absent sellers’
anticompetitive conduct).
13. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1999) (“[P]ure procedural justice obtains when
there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair
procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the
procedure has been properly followed.”).
14. See, e.g., William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 733-34 (2018) (describing the view that, prior
to modern capitalism, “the just price of any particular good or service was tied not to what it
could fetch in the market but rather to its cost of production and to the producer’s station in
life”).
15. F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 33-34
(1990) (asserting that “contemporary legal scholars” believe that “an unconscionable bargain
must be procedurally unfair, in the sense that it was induced through an improper strategy”
and that if “the procedural requirements are satisfied, there is no basis for inquiring into the
contract’s substantive fairness”).
16. Ian Ayres, Three Proposals to Harness Private Information in Contract, 21 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 135, 140 (1997).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 79 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981); see, e.g., De La
Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1014 (Cal. 2018) (“[U]nconscionability requires
oppression or surprise—that is, procedural unconscionability.”).
18. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 907.
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procedural unfairness with seller misbehavior,19 courts and commentators have also endorsed intervention when sellers have
monopoly power over necessary goods or when buyers lack important information.20 And some courts have gone further, striking
down or modifying prices even absent procedural unfairness.21
2. Procedural Imperfections in Pharmaceutical Markets
The possibility that contractually agreed prices can be unfair
absent procedural unfairness would be sufficient to establish the
relevance of Part II.B’s inquiry into substantive fairness, even in a
world where pharmaceutical markets were procedurally impeccable.
But, more importantly, intellectual property protection, regulatory
exclusivity, barriers to market entry, third-party payment, informational asymmetries, and buyer desperation push pharmaceutical
markets far from the theoretical ideal of competition.22 Pharmaceutical patents, of course, involve governmentally created monopolies.23 But even markets for generic drugs are typically at best
oligopolistic, with only a few sellers producing any given drug.24 This
reflects both legal restrictions and scientific obstacles. Pharmaceuticals sold in the United States must meet stringent Food and Drug
Administration regulations.25 And the expertise needed to produce
19. See, e.g., Emerald Portfolio, LLC v. Outer Banks/Kinnakeet Assocs., LLC, 790 S.E.2d
721, 726 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
20. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
931, 948, 955 (1969) (“[A] court may ... interpret ‘oppression’ to mean terms, however
obtained, that will create oppressive effects, so that procedural abuses are irrelevant.”).
21. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 913-15 (collecting cases).
22. See NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 19 (“[D]escribing the biopharmaceutical supply
chain in the United States as largely driven by competitive market forces would be
substantially misleading.”).
23. See Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 284-85 (2016).
24. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, The New Era of Monopoly Is Here, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2016,
9:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/13/-new-era-monopoly-josephstiglitz [https://perma.cc/AKH5-L54N] (listing the pharmaceutical industry among several in
which “what competition exists is oligopolistic”); Brennan et al., supra note 23, at 296 (“[A]s
the Federal Trade Commission has shown, the pharmaceutical industry displays oligopolistic
dynamics.”).
25. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Just Compensation as Transfer Prices, 58 ARIZ. L. REV.
1077, 1089 n.61 (2016) (explaining that “[v]arious legal and economic hurdles,” such as FDA
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even approved drugs is often extensive. Worse, oligopolies often devolve into temporary monopolies when—because of regulatory or
manufacturing issues—only one firm can produce a generic drug.26
Opportunistic firms then exploit temporary monopolies to raise
prices.27
In addition to limited supplier-side competition, buyers’ desire
and ability to bargain for lower prices is also weakened in pharmaceutical markets.28 Rather than being purchased and paid for by
consumers, prescription drugs are selected by physicians and, for
insured patients, paid for wholly or partly by insurers.29 Pharmaceutical markets also involve extensive informational asymmetries,
with buyers often understanding little about the properties of the
drugs being sold.30 This is true even when buyers have the capacity
to make medical decisions, and even more true in situations—such
as emergencies—when buyers lack capacity.31 These informational
asymmetries mean that buyers in pharmaceutical markets often
exhibit what has been called “weak agency.”32 While patients can
look to physicians for information about the medical effects of
prescribed drugs, which helps alleviate informational asymmetries,
physicians do not have to bear the financial costs of drugs33 and
often profit from prescribing more expensive drugs.34 Meanwhile,
safety approval, “limit the entry into the market of generic versions of drugs whose patents
have lapsed”).
26. See Rachel E. Sachs, Addressing Pharmaceutical Price Spikes Through Generic
Preclearance, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 169, 171 (2019).
27. See id.; Blair-Stanek, supra note 25, at 1089 n.61.
28. See Brittany S. Bruns, Note, The Pharmaceutical Access Act: An Administrative
Eminent Domain Solution to High Drug Prices, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 2023, 2030-31 (2018).
29. See BARUCH A. BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRUG TESTING, APPROVAL, AND PRICING 244
(1995); Steven D. Pearson, Len Nichols & Amitabh Chandra, Policy Strategies for Aligning
Price and Value for Brand-Name Pharmaceuticals, HEALTH AFFS., Mar. 2018, at 1-2.
30. Bruns, supra note 28, at 2030 (“[I]nformation asymmetries prevent patients from
making educated choices about the costs and benefits of pharmaceutical products.”).
31. See id. at 2030-31.
32. See DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE 9 (2010) (defining
“weak agency” as arising when “some parties have poor information about the goods they are
exchanging, or in which some parties are not direct participants in the exchange but depend
on others’ decisions” and arguing that weak agency can support a judgment that a market is
noxious).
33. See BRODY, supra note 29, at 244; Bruns, supra note 28, at 2030.
34. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230 F.R.D. 61, 76 (D.
Mass. 2005); Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 2 (explaining that Medicare and private
insurance often give physicians “incentives to prescribe higher-price drugs”).
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insurance reduces patients’ incentive to care about price.35 Last,
pharmaceutical markets are often characterized by buyer desperation.36 Patients facing the prospect of pain, loss of function, or death
often ignore costs as they strive to avoid these outcomes.37 The
combination of buyer vulnerability and weak agency further
supports concerns about the fairness of pharmaceutical markets.38
Because procedural unfairness in pharmaceutical pricing can
result from myriad factors, a uniquely correct strategy for achieving
better procedural fairness is unlikely. Various strategies have been
proposed for increasing competition, including accelerating regulatory approval for generic drugs when shortages exist, incentivizing
firms to enter generic markets when insufficient competition exists,
and creating public or nonprofit drug manufacturers to compete
with private ones.39 Strategies have also been proposed to incentivize physicians and insured patients to be price-sensitive, including
value-based insurance.40
But, even if these strategies successfully improve generic
competition, a purely procedural approach to fair pricing remains
incomplete. Patent protection and regulatory exclusivity, though
they preclude fully competitive markets for new drugs such as
Zolgensma, are not defects but intentional choices to reduce
competition in order to achieve other goals.41 And the often dire
consequences of untreated illness make buyer desperation unavoidable.42 These competition-impeding factors make an account of

35. See BRODY, supra note 29, at 244; Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 1 (observing that
subsidized insurance obscures ordinary signals of demand).
36. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 932 (analogizing the desperation of patients
seeking prescription medication to consumers falling victim to predatory lenders).
37. See Bruns, supra note 28, at 2030.
38. Cf. SATZ, supra note 32, at 9 (describing vulnerability as existing when “some people
are so poor or so desperate that they accept any terms of exchange that are offered”).
39. See Sachs, supra note 26, at 169-70 (summarizing approaches to improving generic
competition); see also Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 871-72 (describing various initiatives,
including a recent proposal to have government manufacture generic medications).
40. See, e.g., Harald Schmidt & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Lowering Medical Costs Through the
Sharing of Savings by Physicians and Patients: Inclusive Shared Savings, 174 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 2009, 2012 (2014).
41. See Sachs, supra note 26, at 170-71.
42. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, When Is the Price of a Drug Unjust? The Average Lifetime
Earnings Standard, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 604, 605 (2019).

942

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:929

substantive fairness for pharmaceutical prices desirable, even
within frameworks that regard competitive market prices as fair.
3. How Procedural Fairness Matters
Rather than understanding fair pricing as confined to procedural
considerations, as a pure procedural justice approach would,
procedural fairness is better understood as one among many
constraints on the fairness of transactions. Serious procedural
defects in a transaction can render that transaction unfair, regardless of price.43 For instance, a transaction in which the seller misrepresents what is sold is unfair, even if the buyer does not pay an
unfair price.44 But not all procedural defects inevitably generate
unfairness. While monopoly power makes substantive unfairness
more likely, a price charged by a monopolist can nevertheless be
substantively fair.45
B. Substantive Fairness
The pervasive procedural defects in pharmaceutical markets
make an examination of substantive fairness particularly important. Many have noted that justifying fairness determinations is
challenging.46 In this Section, I will evaluate four prominent
approaches, which each rely on a different comparison factor: (a) the
cost incurred by the seller, (b) the affordability of the drug to
purchasers, (c) the customary prices charged elsewhere for the drug,
and (d) the social value of the drug.
Scholarly and legislative proposals have recognized these factors
and endorsed some or all as relevant.47 The Prescription Drug Price
43. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 911.
44. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LS.)
(defining “good faith” as including “honesty in fact”).
45. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 912-13 (discussing “sliding-scale” view); MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 76 (1987).
46. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (“[D]eciding
the issue is substantially easier than explaining it.”); Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at
the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial
and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721,
754 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 46, at 752-53.
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Relief Act of 2019 (PDPRA) permits the classification of a drug as
“excessively priced” based on factors including affordability, value,
cost of development, and comparison to international prices.48 Aaron
Kesselheim has similarly suggested that a drug’s clinical value,
affordability, and cost of development are all relevant to whether
the drug is fairly priced.49 Other commentators have identified and
described some or all of the four factors I identify without endorsing
all as relevant. Michelle Mello and Rebecca Wolitz discuss all four
of these factors and endorse the social value approach and
(qualifiedly) the cost approach, while rejecting the affordability
approach.50 Both Frederick Abbott and a team at Yale Law School,
conversely, reject the value approach, as well as the customary
approach, in favor of the cost approach.51 Last, the eminent health
economist Mark Pauly identifies the cost, value, and custom
approaches without explicitly endorsing any.52 I will endorse the
social value approach and explain the problems with the alternatives.
1. Cost of Development
Costs have been regarded as relevant, and sometimes determinative, when assessing the fairness of pharmaceutical prices, as well
as prices more generally.53 Historical approaches to substantive
fairness often judged a price unfair if it too greatly exceeded the
seller’s costs.54 Some modern courts also recognize when a “price is
48. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 870; Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, S.
102, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(2).
49. Aaron Kesselheim, Ethics Talk: What’s a Fair Price for a Drug You’ll Die Without?,
AMA J. ETHICS (2019), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/podcast/ethics-talk-whats-fairprice-drug-youll-die-without [https://perma.cc/HER2-DE4D].
50. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 871, 950, 962.
51. See Frederick M. Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law:
Doctrinal Development to Protect Public Health, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 281, 303-05 (2016); see
also BERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 13 (discussing the cost of development, customary price,
and social value approaches, and praising the cost of development approach as most rigorous).
52. Mark V. Pauly, The Impact of Health Reform on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 1271, 1279-80 (1994).
53. See Bender, supra note 46, at 755 (endorsing the net profit standard as accurately
measuring “unfairness of price and related terms such as interest” based on the costs incurred
by the seller).
54. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 757-58.
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grossly excessive in relation to the seller’s costs.”55 Commentators
recognize disparity between price and cost as a factor favoring
unconscionability, though it is often ambiguous whether the cost
encompasses the seller’s total costs of operation or only the cost of
the good itself.56 They have also argued that cost is a normatively
appropriate basis for assessing fairness.57 More recent case law on
unconscionable prices similarly regards a disparity between cost
and price as constitutive of unfairness.58 Statutes prohibiting price
gouging likewise often refer to the seller’s acquisition costs.59 Some
of these cases, however, are ambiguous between the cost approach
and other approaches discussed in this Part. This is because the
price found unfair is not only disproportionate to cost but also
unaffordable or disproportionate or both to customary value or
social value.60
Psychological research on fair pricing also reveals popular
endorsement of a cost-based standard. In a classic study, Daniel
Kahneman and co-authors found that “respondents endorsed the
fairness of passing on increases in wholesale costs, in operating
costs, and in the costs associated with a rental accommodation.”61
55. Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 644 (N.J. 1971); see also Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l
Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985); Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1361
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (“[T]he sale
was made by a door-to-door salesman for a dealer who therefore would have less overhead
expense than a dealer maintaining a store or showroom.”).
56. See Bender, supra note 46, at 754 (contrasting “the sales price of the good compared
to merchant cost” with “the sales price compared to the merchant’s total costs of operation,
including the cost of the good sold”); see also Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California:
A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 486 (1995).
57. Bender, supra note 46, at 755 (“The net profit measure is the most accurate gauge of
unfairness of price and related terms such as interest.”); Note, Discriminatory Housing
Markets, Racial Unconscionability, and Section 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case, 80
YALE L.J. 516, 553-54 (1971) (endorsing the “reasonable return” test that permitted a seller
to charge its net cost plus a reasonable profit).
58. Whirlpool Corp. v. Grigoleit Co., No. 1:06-CV-0195, 2011 WL 3879486, at *4 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 31, 2011) (finding price unconscionable because it was not moored to “actual cost
and labor data”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 713 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 2013).
59. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 872.
60. See, e.g., Perdue, 702 P.2d at 512 (observing that courts, in addition to considering the
seller’s costs, also consider a good’s market price and its “true value”); Kugler, 279 A.2d at
644; Toker, 274 A.2d at 80 (noting that the unconscionably priced goods were sold “for
approximately 2½ times their reasonable retail value” and that “during the course of the
payments ... [the buyers] were obliged to seek welfare assistance”).
61. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
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For instance, respondents judged it fair for a grocer who paid thirty
cents more for lettuce to raise retail prices correspondingly, for a
landlord facing increasing costs to raise rents, and for a landlord
owning two identical buildings to charge higher rent for an identical
room in the building that had been more expensive to construct.62
Respondents also judged it fair for an unprofitable employer to cut
wages.63 Meanwhile, when costs did not increase, respondents
thought it was unfair to raise prices or conduct an auction in
response to increased demand for a scarce good,64 or to hire the applicant among equally qualified candidates who asks for the lowest
salary.65 More recent work has replicated many of these results.66
Given the use of cost to define fair pricing for other goods, its
appearance in pharmaceutical pricing proposals is unsurprising. For
instance, the Combatting Unreasonable Rises and Excessively
(CURE) High Drug Prices Act defines “price gouging” by reference
to a drug’s cost of production,67 the PDPRA lists “[t]he costs
associated with development of the drug” as a relevant factor,68 and
the recently invalidated Maryland price-gouging statute used cost
of production as part of the determination of when a price increase
is unconscionable.69 The cost approach is also frequently used
abroad. For instance, the Court of Justice of the European Union
has evaluated the fairness of a price by looking at “the difference
between the costs actually incurred and the price actually
charged.”70 Many scholars also endorse a cost of development
approach, arguing that it is the simplest and most comprehensive
way of identifying whether a pharmaceutical price is excessive.71
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 732 (1986).
62. Id. at 732-33.
63. Id. at 733.
64. Id. at 734-35.
65. Id. at 735.
66. See, e.g., Steven J. Kachelmeier, Stephen T. Limberg & Michael S. Schadewald,
Fairness in Markets: A Laboratory Investigation, 12 J. ECON. PSYCH. 447, 456 (1991).
67. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 867-68.
68. Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, S. 102, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(D).
69. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-802(f) (West 2017), invalidated by Ass’n for
Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018).
70. Abbott, supra note 51, at 296 (quoting Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United
Brands Cont’l B.V. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1978 E.C.R. 1-207) (emphasis
omitted).
71. See, e.g., id. at 302; Brennan et al., supra note 23, at 319 (suggesting limiting drug
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One recent white paper asserts that defining “price benchmarks
based on the costs of developing a drug” is “[t]he most rigorous
approach” to fair pricing.72 And Mello and Wolitz have recently
endorsed the view that a pharmaceutical pricing regime “must be
fair to biopharmaceutical companies,” and that fairness “must
permit companies a reasonable return on their overall investment
in research, development, and manufacturing.”73
Despite its popularity, the cost approach has three major flaws.
The first is practical: determining the cost of producing a drug is
very difficult.74 Because most research fails to produce a marketable
drug, the cost of successful drugs is typically understood as including the research and development costs of their failed siblings.75
Firms may also be unwilling to share detailed information about
costs in an analyzable form. Additionally, the task of determining
what level of profit a seller should receive over and above its costs
is also fraught with subjectivity, even for ordinary consumer goods.76
For this reason, some courts have rejected the relevance of cost to
unconscionability.77 Instead, they have concluded that supply and
prices to “risk-adjusted R&D costs plus a reasonable profit”); Evan Ackiron, Note, Patents for
Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 172-73 (1991) (proposing
that “the definition of patent misuse ... include[s] pricing which so exceeds that which is cost
justified as to be unconscionable”); see also Alexander Walsdorf, Note, I Get By with a Little
Help from My 750-Dollar-Per-Tablet Friends: A Model Act for States to Prevent Dramatic
Pharmaceutical Price Increases, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2497, 2528 (2018) (“The pharmaceutical
companies could easily refute the charge of unconscionably high pricing by demonstrating that
recovering their expenses and making a reasonable profit justifies the price they set.”).
72. BERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 13.
73. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 864; see also Walsdorf, supra note 71, at 2528
(arguing that price caps “would unfairly harm pharmaceutical companies who rely on pricing
certain drugs to a higher-than-desired level—from the prospective [sic] of the consumer, at
least—to cover for losses and other operating expenditures”).
74. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 903-06; LENNART RITTER & W. DAVID BRAUN,
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 426 (3d ed. 2004) (“[C]osts can be extraordinarily difficult to
determine, especially for multi-product (e.g., pharmaceutical) firms where fixed costs such as
capital investment, R&D and administrative and selling costs have to be allocated between
many products.”).
75. See RITTER & BRAUN, supra note 74, at 426; see also Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in
the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 313-14 (2009) (arguing that “[r]ate
setting for intellectual property must follow a different set of principles than the traditional
cost-based approach” because “a cost-based intellectual property rate regulation regime would
have to take account of the risk-adjusted investment in the relevant invention”).
76. See Prince, supra note 56, at 551 (observing “the absence of any reliable basis for
determining when profits become so large as to be unconscionable”).
77. E.g., Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (“The percentage
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demand are the appropriate bases for pricing.78 And despite
asserting that fairness requires that firms receive a reasonable
return on investment, Mello and Wolitz ultimately conclude that
“definitions of excessive price that involve assessment of a company’s return on its investment are likely to be troublesome.”79
The cost approach also creates counterproductive incentives.
Pegging prices to costs removes incentives to control costs and in
fact creates incentives to raise them—for instance, to pay higher
salaries to managers at pharmaceutical firms.80 In contrast, defining
fair prices in terms of affordability or social value creates socially
productive incentives: it encourages sellers to lower their prices or
to produce treatments that are more socially valuable.81
Last, the cost approach lacks compelling normative foundations.
There is no obvious normative reason that the seller of a good
should be entitled to recoup the cost of developing and producing
it.82 Modern economic theory understands a good’s price as reflecting supply and demand rather than the cost or burden required to
create it.83 Some very expensive goods, such as artworks, are expensive in view of their scarcity, not because they are costly or burdensome to produce.84 In contrast, goods viewed as interchangeable
of return on defendants’ capital investment is simply immaterial and irrelevant to the issue
of whether or not the contract is unconscionable as between the parties.”); Hertz Corp. v. Att’y
Gen. of State, 518 N.Y.S.2d 704, 709 (App. Div. 1987) (rejecting the view that “a charge
imposed must have a reasonable relationship to actual cost”).
78. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 639 (D. Kan. 1980)
(concluding that “[t]he price of deregulated gas will be determined by supply and demand
rather than the cost of production,” and that “[c]ost of production is no longer the sole
determinative factor in arriving at a fair price”).
79. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 963.
80. For discussions of this phenomenon, known as the Averch-Johnson effect, see id. at
942 & n.549; Pauly, supra note 52, at 1281. See also Eric Lamm, Comment, Keeping
Consumers Out of the Crossfire: Final-Offer Arbitration in the Pharmaceutical Market, 65
UCLA L. REV. 926, 967 (2018) (“A rate-of-return model encourages inefficient uses of cash and
accounting gimmicks to inflate R&D.”).
81. See Emanuel, supra note 42, at 610.
82. Before the development of modern capitalism, preventing economic coercion was the
primary concern in determining prices. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 738.
83. TIMOTHY TAYLOR & STEVEN A. GREENLAW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS ch. 3.1 (2019)
(ebook), https://opentextbc.ca/principlesofeconomics/chapter/3-1-demand-supply-andequilibrium-in-markets-for-goods-and-services/ [https://perma.cc/G6F7-GZGL].
84. Harrington v. Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, 866 (1984) (observing, as part of an
evaluation of a limited run of 250 art prints, that scarcity is “fundamental to the commercial
success of a work of art”), aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Harrington, 774 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1985).
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commodities are often priced at, or even below, their cost of production.85 Buyers and sellers sometimes receive windfalls that do
not reflect cost or burden—a prepaid hotel room in a city that ends
up hosting a major sporting event, or a contract for the delivery of
goods that precedes a major change in price. But these agreements
are not obviously unfair.86 Psychological research suggests that
ordinary people regard the cost of production as relevant to whether
a good has been priced fairly.87 But a psychological reaction that
something is unfair does not normatively establish unfairness.88
Initial psychological responses do not always hold up under
systematic reflection.89 The burden of substantiating the claim that
prices should track the cost of development should be on those
defending the claim. They have not met this burden.
The flaws of the cost approach as a backward-looking way of
assessing fairness do not vitiate the good forward-looking reasons
that might exist to help firms engaged in socially valuable conduct
to offset drug development costs. The risk-adjustment program that
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides to health insurers represents a useful parallel.90 But the protection of risk adjustment is
provided as a forward-looking incentive to achieve the socially
85. Economic theory predicts that the price of goods subject to perfect competition, such
as agricultural commodities, will equal the marginal cost of production. See TAYLOR &
GREENLAW, supra note 83, ch. 8.1, https://opentextbc.ca/principlesofeconomics/chapter/8-1perfect-competition-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/NJ6E-ZKCW]. But in the short run,
prices can drop below cost of production because firms committed to paying their fixed costs
(such as rent) will produce goods even when they are losing money overall. Id.; cf. Alison Peck,
The Cost of Cutting Agricultural Output: Interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV.
451, 478, 485 (2015).
86. E.g., Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n, 539 F.2d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 1976)
(concluding that “contracts made at or before planting time [that] provided for payment at a
price less than half of the market value of the cotton at delivery time” were not
unconscionable because “[t]he increase in price ha[d] nothing to do with unconscionability,”
and that “[t]he test is the character of the contract at the time of making”).
87. Kahneman et al., supra note 61, at 732.
88. Id. at 729.
89. Cf. Govind Persad, Public Preferences About Fairness and the Ethics of Allocating
Scarce Medical Interventions, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAIRNESS, EQUITY, AND
JUSTICE 51, 57-58 (Meng Li & David P. Tracer eds., 2017) (discussing potential gaps between
survey results and normative conclusions).
90. See N.M. Health Connections v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1138,
1146 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Congress included the risk adjustment program in the ACA to stabilize
health insurance premiums, encourage health insurers to provide plans on the exchanges, and
discourage insurers from eluding enrollment of sicker individuals.”).
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desirable goal of greater access to affordable health insurance, not
a backward-looking reward.91 It is equally acceptable to try to
achieve improved insurance access through regulations, such as
requirements to accept enrollees regardless of their health status.92
Patent law provides another example of the distinction between
backward- and forward-looking justifications. Some have argued
that patent protection is justified on backward-looking grounds
because it recognizes creators’ fundamental moral claim to profit
from their creations.93 But the recognized foundation for intellectual
property rights, particularly in the United States, is forwardlooking: patent protection incentivizes socially valuable creation.94
The same is true for pricing. Firms should only be guaranteed
benefits that would be unavailable in a competitive market—like
guaranteed profits or protection from losses—if these benefits are
necessary to achieve socially desirable outcomes.95
These arguments against backward-looking conceptions of fair
pricing also support rejecting the view that it is unfair to charge
different buyers different prices for the same drug. This idea accords
with some psychological research finding that buyers object to price

91. The literature on fair pricing often fails to carefully differentiate backward-looking
from forward-looking justifications. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, On Unknown Opportunities
and Perils: Reflections on Carrier and Minniti’s “Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier,” 2018
U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 72, 77 (“[W]hat if courts were to condemn any agreements or conduct
relating to patented drugs that were not reasonably necessary either to recoup the cost of past,
or to induce investment in future, research and development[?]” (emphasis added)); see also
William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the
Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 667-68 (2007).
92. See, e.g., JENNIFER TOLBERT, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN UPDATE 1 (2015), http://files.kff.org/
attachment/issue-brief-the-coverage-provisions-in-the-affordable-care-act-an-update
[https://perma.cc/3PGR-SVUZ] (“As enacted, the ACA created a framework for enhancing
access to health coverage. It imposed new regulations ... to ensure everyone could purchase
coverage regardless of their health status.”).
93. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 156 (2011) (discussing
creators’ rights); see also Fisher & Syed, supra note 91, at 669 (endorsing the view that some
patent-holders have desert-based claims to benefit financially from their patents).
94. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 116 & n.215 (1999).
95. Cf. Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 209, 227 (2005) (“Corporations themselves have no intrinsic worth. Rather,
their worth is extrinsic.... To put the point more directly, the death of a corporation is cause
for concern only for its effects on individuals.”).
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differentiation.96 A few scholars also criticize differential pricing as
fundamentally unfair, sometimes likening it to racial discrimination.97 But this reaction is difficult to defend. Differential pricing
often can improve social welfare and is widespread in markets.98 For
instance, when lots of goods are sold at auction, some buyers may
end up paying more than others for an identical good. Though
consumers sometimes object to auctions,99 auctions are neither
immoral nor illegal. Auctions also justify rejecting the “like ought to
be treated alike” principle’s conclusion that different prices for the
same drug in different high-income countries is unfair.100 If
purchasing countries are willing to pay different prices, this
provides evidence that they are not alike, even if the differences
between them are difficult to observe.101 Some differences, such as
race, may be unjust bases for differential pricing, but the wrongness
of such differential pricing is not explained by the “like ought to be
treated alike” principle, but by the fact that it disadvantages some
buyers based on a pervasively significant and historically freighted
social category.102
Ultimately, disparities between price and cost, especially for
generic drugs, are better seen as an indicator of potential procedural
unfairness than as constitutive of substantive unfairness. This is
because when prices rise and remain high without a corresponding
change in input costs, there is reason to suspect market imperfections.
96. Kahneman et al., supra note 61, at 735.
97. E.g., Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317,
382 (2002).
98. See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1469, 1512 (2019) (“Discriminatory pricing can ... enable greater output and
access, so long as even low-income consumers are willing (and able) to pay a price at least
equal to marginal cost.”); see also Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get
Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 983 (2012).
99. Kahneman et al., supra note 61, at 735.
100. See Rebecca E. Wolitz, The Pay-Twice Critique, Government Funding, and Reasonable
Pricing Clauses, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 209 (2019) (favorably discussing “[a] nondiscrimination standard” for pharmaceutical pricing “that references high-income foreign
country prices,” in part on the basis that it “reflects a widely accepted moral principle (‘like
ought to be treated alike’)”).
101. Cf. Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer Equality
in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 592-93 & n.194 (2006).
102. Id. at 593 & nn.195-97; cf. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.
537, 568 (1982).
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2. Affordability to Buyers
Fairness can also be assessed by examining whether a price is
affordable to patients in need. The association between fairness and
affordability, though not always explicitly articulated, appears in
many unconscionability decisions,103 and affordability is frequently
mentioned in proposals for drug pricing reform.104 Many cases
emphasize that purchasing an unconscionably priced good consumes
an excessive amount of a poor buyer’s income,105 and some cases find
no unconscionability because of the buyer’s capacity to pay the high
price charged.106 Courts have also found unconscionability when a
poor seller is induced to accept an overly low price, even without any
misconduct on the buyer’s part.107
The affordability approach is persuasively critiqued by Mello and
Wolitz, who argue that although “‘excessive’ drug prices may overlap
with ‘unaffordable’ drug prices, ... it is important to mark these two
terms as conceptually distinct,” and that “an affordable price may
not be a fair price.”108 They reject basing fairness on affordability on
the basis that this “could conflict with ... fairness to drug manufacturers,” which they also view as a component of fairness.109 As
explained above, I disagree with Mello and Wolitz’s conception of

103. See Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); Jones v. Star Credit
Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
104. E.g., NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 126; Drug Pricing, DEP ’ T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., https://perma.cc/MMY9-QHMF (arguing that “access is meaningless without
affordability”); see Press Release, Bill Cassidy & Mark Warner, Sens., Cassidy, Warner Unveil
Draft Legis. to Lower Drug Prices Through Innovative Payment Models (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.cassidy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cassidy-warner-unveil-draftlegislation-to-lower-drug-prices-through-innovative-payment-models [https://perma.cc/5CSCEPC8] [hereinafter Press Release] (legislation to promote outcomes-based pricing titled
“Patient Affordability, Value and Efficiency Act”); Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 871
(discussing the “Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018”).
105. Toker, 274 A.2d at 80; Jones, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
106. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 680 (N.M. 1985), overruled in part on other
grounds by Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901 (N.M. 2009).
107. See, e.g., Freeman v. Ow, No. 16-CV-04817-JST, 2016 WL 6778667, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2016).
108. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 864 n.19.
109. Id.; see also Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription
Drugs the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2273, 2286 (2018).
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fairness to manufacturers.110 But I agree with them that fair pricing
and affordability to individual buyers are separate.
Zeke Emanuel has recently defended an affordability approach to
drug pricing.111 Emanuel argues that the lifetime cost for all drugs
that a person takes over a lifetime should not exceed 11 percent of
average lifetime disposable income in their country; in the United
States, that means that lifetime drug costs for all drugs should not
exceed $70,715.112 Emanuel’s approach laudably attempts to
quantify affordability and engages the possibility that price
regulation might channel innovation more productively rather than
foreclosing it.113 But defining a combined maximum price for all
drugs presents problems. Some drugs, such as antiretrovirals and
chemotherapeutics, are typically taken together with others, and
people often take many different types of drugs over their lifetimes.
This makes it difficult to derive from Emanuel’s proposal an answer
to the question of whether any given drug’s price is too high.
The lifetime cost approach also seems to set the price ceiling
simultaneously too low, from a societal perspective, and too high,
from an individual perspective. This flaw is not unique to Emanuel’s
proposal: it is a familiar problem with attempts to use price
regulation, rather than subsidies, to achieve affordability for
individual buyers.114 Price regulations that achieve affordability for
the average patient provide a large windfall to wealthy buyers
whose ability to pay exceeds the price ceiling, while leaving poor
buyers in a difficult position.115
Because the average lifetime earnings approach considers only
individual costs without systematically considering the social value
110. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
111. Emanuel, supra note 42, at 607. Emanuel’s account requires that a drug meet both an
affordability and a social value standard. Id. at 606-07.
112. Id. at 609.
113. Id. at 610 (observing that value- or affordability-based price regulation “might better
direct pharmaceutical innovation”).
114. Cf. JOSEPH HEATH, ECONOMICS WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 155 (2010) (arguing that
electricity price caps that aim to improve affordability for poor consumers are often
regressive); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be
Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 342 (1998) (“[S]ociety should
allow relative prices in competitive housing markets to serve their allocative role of directing
resources to their most efficient uses and then ... implement tax-and-transfer policies to
redistribute resources in line with society’s distributive goals.”).
115. See HEATH, supra note 114, at 156-57.
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of new drugs, it often sets the ceiling too low. From a societal
perspective, a new drug is cost-saving if it saves money compared to
existing treatments. Typical cost-effectiveness thresholds in the
United States are $50,000-$150,000 per quality-adjusted life-year
saved.116 A drug that extends healthy life by 1.5 quality-adjusted
life-years at a cost of $74,000 is under $50,000 per quality-adjusted
life-year: it is cost-effective even at a $50,000 threshold, and
potentially cost-saving if it replaces a costlier drug for the same
condition. Yet this drug on its own would exceed the average
lifetime income threshold. This mismatch between value and
affordability arises because the price a seller receives need not be,
and often is not, the price patients pay. As discussed in Part I.A.2,
many patients have their costs partly or wholly paid by public or
private insurance. It can be reasonable for insurers—particularly
public insurers—to pay for drugs patients would be unable to afford
on their own, especially when the drugs save money compared to
current treatments.
Meanwhile, even a bill of $400 is unaffordable for many Americans.117 While lifetime costs are the right place to focus from a societal perspective, a drug that costs $1,000 or $2,000 for a one-time
dose could meet the average lifetime income standard but be
unaffordable, whereas one that costs three dollars per day over a
seventy-year span would exceed the average lifetime income standard but would be more affordable.
Concerns about individual affordability have instead motivated
some to take the position that some or all medicines should be free
to patients.118 Recent surveys of patients in Australia and New
Zealand reveal that 45 percent of New Zealanders believe all
medicines should be free to all patients,119 and that 60 percent of

116. Emanuel, supra note 42, at 607.
117. See Neal Gabler, The Secret Shame of Middle-Class Americans, ATLANTIC (2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/my-secret-shame/476415/ [https://
perma.cc/JB5G-GCMY].
118. E.g., Matthew Cortland (@mattbc), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 7:36 PM), https://twitter.
com/mattbc/status/1098380835584180225 [https://perma.cc/XHC2-2CG7] (“Insulin should be
free. Absolutely, totally, 100% free.”).
119. Charon Lessing, Toni Ashton & Peter Davis, New Zealand Patients’ Understanding
of Brand Substitution and Opinions on Copayment Options for Choice of Medicine Brand, 40
AUSTL. HEALTH REV. 345, 347 (2016).
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Australian patients believe essential medicines should be free.120
Achieving this goal through the price system by setting drug prices
to zero, however, would eliminate incentives to develop or even
produce medicines. A more plausible understanding of the view is
that medicines should have no out-of-pocket costs at the point of
use, which is compatible with permitting sellers to charge a price
that is paid for by public or private insurers, or having government
purchase their patent rights. In addition, notwithstanding the
popularity of the view that drugs should not have out-of-pocket
costs, it is not obviously unjust to charge patients for drugs while
ensuring affordability through insurance and targeted subsidies,
just as many other essentials such as food, housing, and health
insurance are made affordable, albeit imperfectly, through targeted
subsidies.121 The use of only nominal drug copayments in publicly
subsidized insurance, such as Medicaid, represents an example of
such subsidies.122
Ultimately, while affordability is important, individual affordability is better achieved through expanding and improving
insurance than through the price system. Affordability to society is
an appropriate basis for pricing, but affordability to society should
be based on social value—as discussed in Part I.B.4 below—rather
than on patients’ average income.
3. Customary Price
Another way of assessing fairness is a custom-based approach,
which compares a good’s price to the price other sellers charge for
similar goods. This approach is frequently used in unconscionability
cases for ordinary consumer goods.123 Courts found unconscionability
120. Evan Doran, Jane Robertson & Glenn Salkeld, Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme Cost
Sharing, Patient Cost Consciousness and Prescription Affordability, 35 AUSTL. HEALTH REV.
37, 39 (2011).
121. See Govind Persad, Choosing Affordable Health Insurance, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819,
865 (2020).
122. See, e.g., Medicaid Benefits: Prescription Drugs, KFF (2018), https://www.kff.org/
medicaid/state-indicator/prescription-drugs/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22co1
Id%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/7JVH-6GAV]. Thanks
to Rachel Sachs for this example.
123. State v. Strong Oil Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 345, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (“[A] contract will be
found unconscionable on the basis of price when there is a great disparity between the selling
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in the sale of a refrigerator with a retail value of $300 for $900,124 of
a freezer for two and a half times its reasonable retail value,125 and
of jade carvings for more than twice their retail value.126 In contrast,
a price twice the typical retail price was judged acceptable when the
buyer received additional benefits unique to the particular sale.127
More recently, interest rates that exceed typical rates in the credit
market have been found unconscionable.128 Prices substantially
below, rather than above, market value can also be found unconscionable.129 The custom approach is also commonly used in statutes
that aim to prevent unfair pricing.130
The custom approach has been used to determine fair pricing for
pharmaceuticals, most prominently in the use of international
reference pricing, in which drug prices are set by reference to the
average price that is charged in similar countries.131 Many complaints about unfair drug pricing have involved objections that
American consumers are being charged different prices than
consumers abroad for the same drugs, or that drug prices are
deviating dramatically upward from what they typically have
been.132 The recent Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2020
also incorporates a limited version of a custom-based approach by
requiring pharmaceutical firms to reimburse Medicare if drug prices
increase more rapidly than inflation.133
Compared to the cost and affordability approaches, the custom
approach has been praised for its greater administrability.134 But
price of the goods and its actual market value.”), aff’d, 451 N.Y.S.2d 437 (App. Div. 1982); see
also Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1994).
124. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
125. Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970).
126. Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
127. Remco Enters., Inc. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567, 572-73 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
128. Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 849 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding unconscionability in part because “the ‘price’ of the credit was, by at least one objective measure,
roughly ten times its value”).
129. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 281 F.2d 202, 208 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (finding a
payment of “only 38% of the value of the land” unconscionable).
130. See Bender, supra note 46, at 766.
131. See Abbott, supra note 51, at 303; Pauly, supra note 52, at 1280.
132. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 897 (discussing price spike legislation); Wolitz,
supra note 100, at 209 (“[M]any are deeply dismayed by disparities in what Americans pay
for their medications and the prices paid in other high-income countries.”).
133. Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2020, S. 4199, 116th Cong. §§ 106, 128.
134. Prince, supra note 56, at 487.
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the custom approach has a set of disadvantages that are familiar
elsewhere in law. Most importantly, as courts have recognized, it
cannot identify unfair customary practices.135 As Frederick Abbott
points out, “It is entirely possible that the lowest baseline price (or
the average) among a basket of markets is excessive.”136
The problem with relying on custom alone is apparent when
considering fair pricing for a new drug like Zolgensma, for which no
customary price exists.137 The drug could be priced by analogy to
other drugs for the same condition, or that provide similar value,
but these strategies admit the relevance of factors other than
custom—in particular, social value—in setting the price. And an
approach like the Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2020
would provide no guidance because it applies only to price increases,
not to initial pricing.138 While custom can be an easily manageable
way of setting prices, it relies on the existence of benchmark prices
set via some other method, and its normative attractiveness
similarly depends on the normative attractiveness of those benchmark prices. Rather than being understood as an independent
method, custom-based pricing is better thought of as a way of
relying on pricing decisions that are made on some other basis to
avoid the political and logistical burdens of making these pricing
decisions oneself.139
4. Value to Society
Under what I call a social value approach, a drug’s price should
reflect its value to society, with drugs that greatly extend life or
improve health commanding a higher price than drugs with lesser
benefits. On this approach, fair pricing is defined in a forwardlooking way, in terms of value to patients and society. Several

135. See Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402-03 (Ct. App. 1994).
136. Abbott, supra note 51, at 303; cf. Crane, supra note 75, at 315 (“[B]enchmarking
suffers from the fact that the rest of the market—including the benchmark contracts—may
already be the products of the defendant’s monopoly power.”).
137. Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 903.
138. See generally S. 4199.
139. See Persad, supra note 121, at 834; see also Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette
& Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 98 (2020)
(“Reference pricing works because it assumes some other country has set the right price.”).
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commentators, including Emanuel as well as Mello and Wolitz,
regard social value as relevant to fairness, though they do not
develop a detailed account of value-based pricing.140
How should we assess social value? The most common way of
measuring social value compares a drug’s price to its benefits
quantified in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) or
disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs).141 Social value is typically
used to define the boundaries of a fair price rather than to set an
exact price to which sellers or buyers are entitled.142 Medications
whose cost of production is low and that are produced by several
competing sellers, such as many generics, will typically be priced
lower than the maximum price that their social value could justify,
meaning that pharmaceutical sellers will not capture the full social
value of the products they sell. As an example, manufacturers of
generic statins, used to treat excessive cholesterol, are unlikely to
be able to price their products at the maximum that their substantial social value would warrant. Instead, generic manufacturers will
receive a competitive market price. This recalls the well-known
diamond-water problem: water is inexpensive compared to diamonds, even though much more socially valuable, because the
comparatively easy availability of water means that it can be
obtained for a price lower than the maximum that consumers would
be willing to pay if faced with scarcity.143
The social value approach uses prices to achieve a goal to which
prices are ideally suited—signaling to firms where they should
direct investment—while responding to procedural imperfections in
pharmaceutical markets that make an unregulated price system
undesirable. In competitive markets, price signals allow sellers to
identify what quantity of a product buyers value at a given price
and to direct their production accordingly.144 A pharmaceutical
140. See Emanuel, supra note 42, at 606-07; Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 961; Lamm,
supra note 80, at 967-68.
141. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 961; Lamm, supra note 80, at 967.
142. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 961.
143. See John Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? Reassessing Copyright and Patent
Enforcement in the Digital Age, 72 CIN. L. REV. 45, 51 (2003) (explaining that “diamonds have
a market value far in excess of water since their availability relative to demand is slight”); see
also Uwe Reinhardt, On the Much Used (and Abused) Word “Value” in Healthcare, 28 J.
HEALTH ADMIN. EDUC. 259, 262 (2011).
144. See Elizabeth Anderson, How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?, 9
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market without price regulation, however, produces undesirable
results because patients’ demand for treatments is price-insensitive.145 The social value approach addresses this problem by incentivizing the development of socially valuable treatments. Unlike the
other approaches discussed in this Part, it requires that a drug’s
price be justified prospectively by the health benefits it offers to
future patients—not retrospectively as compensation for past
spending on research or manufacturing. What justifies price regulation in pharmaceutical markets is that, because of limited
competition and inelastic buyer demand, unregulated pricing fails
to effectively incentivize socially valuable innovation.
The social value approach’s strategy of using price to incentivize
socially valuable outcomes has some parallels with recent proposals
to use prizes, or other forms of regulation, to incentivize the
production of socially valuable drugs.146 What is distinctive about
this Article’s proposal is that it bases a drug’s price, rather than the
length of its market exclusivity or the magnitude of a publicly
provided prize or enforced penalty, on the drug’s value to society. In
the next two Parts, I will consider how social value should be
defined and how social value criteria should be employed to
constrain prices.
II. DEFINING SOCIAL VALUE
Using social value to constrain prices requires a process for
assessing social value. In Part II.A, I consider both conventional
and extended cost-effectiveness analyses as options for assessing
and defining social value. I argue that extended cost-effectiveness
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 239, 242 (2008) (“The efficiency of markets essentially depends on
their ability to convey price signals.”); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy
Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 802 (2008).
145. See Bruns, supra note 28, at 2064 (explaining inelastic demand for pharmaceuticals);
Brennan et al., supra note 23, at 296 (explaining inelastic demand alternatively as people
being “extremely sensitive to even small differences in health outcomes”).
146. E.g., Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 2-3 (discussing “contingent exclusivity” proposal
that would “leave manufacturers free to charge what they wanted but vary the length of their
monopoly protection” in proportion to their drug’s benefits); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of
Intellectual Property: Health as a Case Study, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128 (2007)
(discussing a government-funded “patent prize system that calibrated rewards” on a social
value basis, with prizewinning drugs thereafter “made available at marginal cost”).
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analysis is the most desirable approach, but should incorporate only
normatively justified interests. In Part II.B, I examine and critically
evaluate different ways of defining a social value threshold, which
differentiates drugs that are socially valuable at a given price from
those that are not.
A. Conventional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Most proposals to incorporate social value into pharmaceutical
policy rely on cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). The National
Academies of Medicine (NAM) report on pharmaceutical policy
explains how CEA is employed:
Value assessments often involve cost-effectiveness analysis, in
which the ratio of the added health gains from a medical
intervention to the added costs of treatment is calculated, and a
pre-established cutoff value is used to determine which interventions are worthy of support. The use of a quality-adjusted lifeyear as the health outcome measure in cost-effectiveness
analyses has gained wide acceptance in many countries and is
used in coverage and reimbursement decisions. The National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence in the United Kingdom,
for example, uses cost-effectiveness to provide advice about
which drugs and treatments should be made available in its
National Health Service.147

As the NAM Report also explains, many national health systems
also use CEA either to define a maximum price at which a given
drug can be sold or to define the reimbursements that governmental or government-regulated payers provide for specific drugs.148
England, Scotland, and Sweden use cost per QALY approaches to
set prices, and Canada also uses cost-effectiveness considerations in
price setting.149 In addition to the countries that use cost-effective
147. NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 54 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 83-87.
149. Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 3; WORLD HEALTH ORG., ACCESS TO NEW MEDICINES
IN EUROPE 61 (2015); Steven Morgan, Summaries of National Drug Coverage and
Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies in 10 Countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. 6-8, 26-28 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2018-
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ness for pricing, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovakia, Poland, Switzerland, New Zealand, and the UK use it for
determining reimbursement.150 Other countries such as Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain use a broader range of criteria,
which often include cost-effectiveness as a component.151
Despite the popularity of CEA in other national health systems,
it has met resistance stateside. Reasons for this resistance include
concerns that conventional CEA is unfair to people with disabilities,152 and that it ignores other important outcomes, such as
protection against financial risk, nonmedical cost savings, or
reduction in health disparities.153 These concerns have motivated
interest in modifications to CEA.
B. Modifying Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
When evaluating proposed modifications to CEA, normatively
compelling concerns must be distinguished from exercises of interest
group politics. The NAM report asserts that “simply using costeffectiveness as the outcome measure leaves out other factors such
as public perceptions of a disease, political interests, social justice,
and other practical considerations, that need to be taken into
account when making important societal decisions.”154 But while
these factors are all practical considerations, not all have equal
normative importance. Conflicts between justice and conventional
09/Steven%20Morgan%2C%20PhD_Ten%20Country%20Pharma%20Policy%20Summaries
_2016%Vancouver%20Group%20Meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U9K-598L].
150. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 149, at 65, 67; Morgan, supra note 149, at 2-3, 20,
23-24, 29.
151. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 149, at 61; Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 3
(observing that countries that benchmark their price guidelines to others that use costeffectiveness “are, in effect, adopting the same underlying methodology”).
152. See Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act,
41 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 132 (2015) [hereinafter Persad, Priority Setting]; Govind Persad,
Considering Quality of Life While Repudiating Disability Injustice: A Pathways Approach to
Setting Priorities, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 294, 297 (2019) [hereinafter Persad, Considering
Quality of Life].
153. Emanuel, supra note 42, at 606 (explaining that cost-effectiveness analysis often
disregards distributional outcomes, and arguing that pricing should consider a treatment’s
nonhealth benefits); Stéphane Verguet, Jane J. Kim & Dean T. Jamison, Extended CostEffectiveness Analysis for Health Policy Assessment: A Tutorial, 34 PHARMACOECONOMICS 913,
918 (2016).
154. NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 55.
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CEA provide a normatively compelling reason to modify CEA even
under ideal circumstances.155 In contrast, conflicts between CEA and
mere public perceptions or political interests do not, without more,
generate normatively compelling reasons to modify CEA because
public perceptions and political interests can be unjust. One
example of such publicly endorsed and politically implemented
injustice is the ban on travel to the United States by people with
HIV, which was supported by members of the public in thousands
of letters.156 This public reaction helps explain why the ban remained, but does not suffice to justify the ban. A modification to
CEA that assigned priority to diseases based on their social popularity would similarly be explicable but not obviously justifiable.
In this Section, I will argue that it can be normatively compelling
to depart from conventional CEA in order to (1) improve fairness to
patients with preexisting disabilities, or (2) achieve other important
outcomes such as disparity reduction or realization of important
nonhealth goals. In contrast, it is not normatively compelling to
depart from traditional CEA in order to permit higher prices for
rare disease drugs or “last chance” therapies. Such departures
create socially counterproductive incentives to develop drugs that
save fewer lives without a countervailing benefit.
1. Fairness to People with Preexisting Disabilities
Much of the controversy over CEA in American health policy has
involved claims that CEA unfairly disadvantages patients with
preexisting disabilities whose future years of life due to treatment
are assigned a lower quality weight.157 These charges have been
marshalled against a variety of policy proposals, including the
initial version of Oregon’s Medicaid plan in the 1990s.158 The
155. See, e.g., A. Zwerling, D. Dowdy, A. von Delft, H. Taylor & M.W. Merritt, Incorporating
Social Justice and Stigma in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis
Treatment, 21 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE S69, S69 (2017).
156. Michael Vinikoor, Celebrating the End of the HIV/AIDS Travel Ban, HEALTH AFFS.
BLOG (July 20, 2012), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20120720.021381/full/
[https://perma.cc/7GG9-3SHL]. As the political tides shifted, the ban was eventually removed
in 2010. Id.
157. See Persad, Priority Setting, supra note 152, at 132.
158. Id. (citing Maxwell J. Mehlman, Melvyn R. Durchslag & Duncan Neuhauser, When
Do Health Care Decisions Discriminate Against Persons with Disabilities?, 22 J. HEALTH POL.
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Affordable Care Act limited, though did not proscribe, the use of
CEA by Medicare, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, and insurers on the ACA’s exchanges; its limitations focus on
fairness to people with preexisting disabilities.159 Most recently,
proposals to use CEA in private insurers’ coverage and reimbursement decisions have raised concerns about fairness to patients with
disabilities.160
These concerns have prompted various modifications to costeffectiveness approaches. Such modifications do not abandon CEA’s
goal of getting more value for money but instead modify what counts
as a valuable outcome.161 Such a modification is normatively
attractive because it avoids compounding preexisting disadvantage,
especially when that disadvantage results from injustice.162 One
such approach, the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review’s
Equal Value of Life Years Gained, does so by excluding quality of
life from consideration.163 Other approaches modify QALYs to give
greater weight to interventions that benefit individuals who are
worse off 164 or differentiate cases in which lower quality of life
results from disability discrimination.165 Other recent proposals
calculate the value of extended life separately from that of improved
quality of life.166 These new approaches have not yet been employed
as extensively as conventional CEA but represent promising
strategies for addressing concerns about disability discrimination.

POL’Y & L. 1385, 1396 (1997)).
159. Id. at 129-47.
160. Steven D. Pearson, Commentary, Why the Coming Debate over the QALY and
Disability Will Be Different, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 304, 306 (2019).
161. Persad, Considering Quality of Life, supra note 152, at 301.
162. See id. at 296; see also Samuel J. Kerstein, Dignity, Disability, and Lifespan, 34 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 635, 645 (2017).
163. See Pearson, supra note 160, at 306.
164. Tyler M. John, Joseph Millum & David Wasserman, How to Allocate Scarce Health
Resources Without Discriminating Against People with Disabilities, 33 ECON. & PHIL. 161, 170
(2017).
165. Persad, Considering Quality of Life, supra note 152, at 296.
166. Anirban Basu, Josh Carlson & David Veenstra, Health Years in Total: A New Health
Objective Function for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 23 VALUE HEALTH 96, 98 (2020); Lucio
Esposito & Nicole Hassoun, Measuring Health Burden Without Discriminating Against the
Disabled, 39 J. PUB. HEALTH 633, 634 (2017).
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2. Consideration of Other Important Outcomes
Conventional CEA gives no weight to the distribution of QALYs
among beneficiaries nor to the realization of nonhealth outcomes.167
But there are normatively compelling reasons to value nonhealth
outcomes, such as environmental protection, and also to narrow
health disparities.168 Including nonhealth outcomes serves to avoid
what I have elsewhere called the “Gift of the Magi” problem, when
policies in different administrative sectors undermine one another
because they do not consider outcomes beyond their sector—for
instance, health policies that ignore environmental effects, and
environmental policies that ignore health effects.169 The goal of
narrowing health disparities can find further support in an often
overlooked part of the ACA that requires consideration of fairness
to “diverse segments of the population.”170 Disparity alleviation and
the importance of nonhealth outcomes favor employing costeffectiveness methodologies that are able to incorporate these
aims.171 Such methodologies are often dubbed “extended costeffectiveness analysis.”172 Basing a value-based price on extended
CEA would incentivize the development of drugs that help achieve
important nonhealth and distributional outcomes.173

167. See Michael D. Rawlins & Anthony J. Culyer, National Institute for Clinical Excellence
and Its Value Judgments, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 224, 226 (2004).
168. See Emanuel, supra note 42, at 606 (“Life activities other than health matter; in
considering the benefits of a treatment, we should also consider how it affects education,
employment, and other valuable life activities.”); Emily Whelan Parento, Health Equity,
Healthy People 2020, and Coercive Legal Mechanisms as Necessary for the Achievement of
Both, 58 LOY. L. REV. 655, 670 (2012) (defining health disparities and explaining why they are
unjust).
169. Govind Persad, Beyond Administrative Tunnel Vision: Widening the Lens of Costs and
Benefits, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941, 946 (2017).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C); see also Persad, Priority Setting, supra note 152, at 147.
171. See Verguet et al., supra note 153, at 913.
172. Id.
173. Cf. Lemley et al., supra note 139, at 128 (proposing regulatory change to encourage
manufacturers to develop “drugs treating diseases that primarily impact low-income
populations, including mental health conditions and neglected tropical diseases”).

964

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:929

3. Prioritizing Rare Disease Treatments
The case for modifying cost-effectiveness analysis to incentivize
the development of drugs that treat patients with less common
diseases is much weaker than the case for the modifications
discussed in Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. To see why, consider the
philosopher John Taurek’s famous example: six patients are
severely ill and only five doses of medicine are available, but five of
the patients require only one dose each, while one would require all
five doses.174 Absent any other differences between the patients,
both laypeople and normative theorists agree that the five should be
saved.175 Because treatments for rare conditions have smaller
potential markets and therefore are only developed if higher prices
can be charged, many rare disease patients are in the same position
as Taurek’s patient who needs all five doses.176 One recent study
found that “median cost per patient is 5.5 times higher for orphan
drugs than for non-orphan drugs.”177 Permitting higher prices for
rare disease drugs creates an incentive to develop drugs that treat
fewer rather than more patients. Creating such an incentive is akin
to saving the one person in Taurek’s original example.
Some patient advocates have argued that conventional CEA
should be modified to encourage the development of rare disease
drugs.178 These arguments have gotten some traction in other
countries’ national systems.179 But departing from conventional CEA
174. John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 293, 294 & n.2
(1977) (citing Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in
MORAL PROBLEMS 28, 35 (James Rachels ed., 1971)).
175. See Mark Kelman, Intuitions, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1307 n.29 (2013) (reporting
empirical confirmation of “the predictable finding that far fewer people believe it permissible
to save one drowning man rather than ten if one foregoes saving the ten by saving just the
one”); Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 897 (2000)
(“Most philosophers who have considered Taurek’s argument have resisted it.”).
176. See, e.g., NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 21 (“[P]olicies that are optimal for some
patients may not benefit other patients (e.g., the small numbers of people with rare diseases
often require the most costly medicines).”); id. at 114 (“Drugs for rare diseases often have
higher prices because of the small size of the eligible patient population.”).
177. Id. Orphan drugs are drugs that treat rare diseases. Id.
178. See, e.g., H.I. Hyry, J.C.P. Roos & T.M. Cox, Commentary, Orphan Drugs: Expensive
yet Necessary, 108 QJM: INT’L J. MED. 269, 271 (2015).
179. See Emily Harris, Addressing the Needs of Canadians with Rare Diseases: An
Evaluation of Orphan Drug Incentives, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 648, 661 (2018).
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in order to provide stronger incentives to develop rare disease
drugs—while politically unsurprising given the tendency of small,
well-organized groups to wield outsized political power180—is not
ethically well founded. Pricing policies should aim to provide
equitable incentives and not to value benefits for rare disease patients more highly than benefits for those with more common
diseases. The NAM report observes that “previously neglected rare
diseases that afflict only small numbers of people (but which have
large impacts on individuals and their families) have been benefitting from innovative therapies.”181 While treating rare diseases
benefits patients, rarer diseases are not more impactful on a perpatient basis than common diseases.182 Dying of a common cancer
is just as detrimental a loss as dying of an uncommon one. This
point also illustrates the non sequitur underlying the claim that
rare diseases should receive priority because “the more a disease
impairs a person’s capacity to pursue their goals, the more urgent
it is that their health need is addressed.”183 A patient who dies of a
common cancer is no less impeded in pursuing her goals than a
patient who dies of a rare cancer. A pricing policy that treats
patients equally means that price should reflect the number of
patients benefited and the amount of benefit, not whether the
disease is rare or common.
That severity and rarity are distinct also means that incorporating the “rule of rescue” into health-system-level decisions (a
debatable choice, given that health policymakers, unlike physicians,
do not have duties to rescue specific patients)184 does not support
prioritizing rare diseases over other conditions. Emily Largent and
Steve Pearson suggest that the rule of rescue might justify paying
large sums to treat certain rare diseases—for instance, paying more

180. Cf. John Meadowcroft, Patients, Politics, and Power: Government Failure and the
Politicization of U.K. Health Care, 33 J. MED. & PHIL. 427, 434, 440 (2008); Karl Claxton,
Mark Sculpher, Stephen Palmer & Anthony J. Culyer, Causes for Concern: Is NICE Failing
to Uphold Its Responsibilities to All NHS Patients?, 24 HEALTH ECON. 1, 2 (2015) (observing
that identifiable beneficiaries of programs are able to advance their interests at the expense
of “those unidentified NHS patients who bear the true opportunity costs of NICE decisions”).
181. NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 160.
182. See id.
183. Hyry et al., supra note 178, at 270.
184. See BRODY, supra note 29, at 212-14.
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than $200,000 per year for a Gaucher disease treatment.185 But if
such expenditures are justifiable, they should be equally justifiable
if needed to treat a patient with a comparably severe but more
common disease. The rule of rescue responds to identifiable severity,
not rarity.186
Rare disease advocates have also tried to argue that “[c]ostefficiency calculations cannot be used to prioritize between different
patients and patient groups ... because ... one person’s equal opportunities and liberties cannot be sacrificed for another’s.”187 But
this argument overlooks the fact that allowing higher prices for rare
disease drugs prioritizes rare disease patients over others without
an obvious justification. Pricing policies shape decisions about which
research avenues to pursue and which conditions to prioritize
treating. Encouraging drugmakers to save more lives by developing
treatments that have benefits for a larger patient population is no
different from encouraging them to save more lives through
investing in greater efficacy or lower toxicity.
All of what I say above is compatible with arguments that costeffectiveness thresholds should be raised.188 If some rare diseases
deserve investment despite high costs, perhaps spending on health
care should increase to fund all treatments that are comparably
cost-effective. But patients with common diseases should not be
treated less favorably than patients with rare ones.
While some treatments for rare disease patients will score poorly
under either conventional or modified CEA,189 value-based policies
need not run contrary to the interests of rare disease patients. Most
importantly, a value-based ceiling on prices will—unlike a reimbursement limit—produce major improvements in access for rare
disease patients in the short term, because the prices of rare disease
drugs currently on the market will need to drop in order to align

185. Emily A. Largent & Steven D. Pearson, Which Orphans Will Find a Home? The Rule
of Rescue in Resource Allocation for Rare Diseases, 42 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27, 32 (2012).
186. See id. at 27.
187. Hyry et al., supra note 178, at 270.
188. See Peter J. Neumann, Joshua T. Cohen & Milton C. Weinstein, Updating CostEffectiveness—The Curious Resilience of the $50,000-per-QALY Threshold, 371 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 796, 796-97 (2014).
189. See Claxton et al., supra note 180, at 5-6.
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with their social benefit.190 Additionally, many treatments for
common conditions—for instance, new antibiotics or pain relievers—could improve health outcomes for all patients.
4. Assisting Patients Without Other Options
Mello and Wolitz argue that pricing policy should consider the
public health importance of specific drugs.191 In defining public
health importance, they reference work by the health economist
Mariana Socal, who argues that, when deciding whether a drug
should be a priority for price regulation, “key considerations might
include (1) whether the drug saves lives or averts serious harms; (2)
the number of people dependent on the drug; and (3) how many
alternative therapies are available for the health condition(s) the
drug treats.”192 The first and second criteria are simple and normatively compelling: how many patients benefit, and how much
each patient benefits.193
However, the third criterion departs from cost-effectiveness
principles and equal treatment in a way that is difficult to defend.
Basing decisions on the availability of alternatives implicitly
regards extending or improving the lives of patients who lack other
options as preferable to extending or improving, by the same
amount, the lives of patients who have access to some options, even
toxic or ineffective ones. Other commentators, including both some
patient advocates and a minority appendix to the NAM report, go
further to advocate entirely abandoning cost-effectiveness considerations when a drug is the only treatment for a given condition.194
190. See infra Part III.A.
191. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 963.
192. Id. at 963-64 (citing Memorandum from Mariana Socal et al. on Behalf of the Johns
Hopkins Drug Access and Affordability Initiative to Josh Auerbach, Assistant Attorney
General, State of Maryland 1-5 (Sept. 21, 2017)).
193. See id.
194. Michael Rosenblatt & Henri Termeer, A Dissenting View, in NAM REPORT, supra note
11, at 159, 174 (“Imagine that a new drug is created that effectively treats a condition for
which there never has been an effective treatment. Under these circumstances, it is hard to
imagine the federal government or insurers telling patients or parents of affected children
that the drug will not be made available.”); Hyry et al., supra note 178, at 270 (arguing that
social value assessments “should not be deployed when the choice is between an only
treatment and no treatment ... because failure to provide any treatment would entirely deny
an individual the right to pursue their life plan”).
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Departing from conventional CEA to give greater weight to saving
patients without other options is no more justifiable than modifying
it to give greater weight to saving patients with less common conditions. Consider the example of tenofovir for HIV,195 or the more
recent case of hepatitis C antivirals such as sofosbuvir.196 Tenofovir
was not the first treatment for people with HIV,197 nor were the
newer antivirals the first treatment for patients with hepatitis C.198
But the older treatments for these diseases were less effective and
had serious side effects: interferon plus ribavirin for hepatitis had
neuropsychiatric effects including depression and suicidal ideation,199 and stavudine treatment for HIV caused neuropathy and
lipodystrophy.200 The development of sofosbuvir almost certainly
saved many more lives than the development of a new “last chance”
drug for a condition that affects few people. While policy should
incentivize the development and production of drugs that have
substantial benefits over the status quo—which often are drugs for
previously untreated conditions—a modification to CEA that
produces a disincentive to invest in drugs like sofosbuvir is difficult
to defend.
C. Defining the Social Value Threshold
In pharmaceutical policy, CEA is typically used to define either
the maximum price that can be charged for a specific drug201 or the
maximum price a governmental or regulated payer will pay.202
Certain maximum thresholds, such as $50,000, $100,000, or
$150,000 per QALY, are often used but not always carefully

195. See supra Part I.B.4.
196. See Neumann et al., supra note 188, at 797.
197. See Jay Purcell, Adverse Clinical and Public Health Consequences of Limited AntiRetroviral Licensing, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 103, 105 (2010).
198. See NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 78.
199. See Linda S. Good, “The Shadow Epidemic”: Hepatitis C and the Law, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 21, 29-30 (2001).
200. Purcell, supra note 197, at 119.
201. See NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 26, 82.
202. See Claxton, supra note 180, at 1.
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justified.203 This Section reviews approaches for defining and
justifying these maximum thresholds.
1. Per Capita Income
The World Health Organization’s project on cost-effectiveness
advocates the use of per capita income to define a CEA threshold:
[I]nterventions that avert one DALY [disability-adjusted lifeyear] for less than average per capita income for a given country
or region are considered very cost-effective; interventions that
cost less than three times average per capita income per DALY
averted are still considered cost-effective; and those that exceed
this level are considered not cost-effective.204

Some countries, most prominently Poland, explicitly define a
maximum threshold using per capita income.205 Others use thresholds roughly consistent with the per capita income approach but
express them as a round number that falls within the WHO’s
recommended range—for instance, Thailand’s threshold of one
hundred thousand Thai baht.206
Income-based thresholds present the problem that they can
permit drugs to be priced or reimbursed at levels that are unaffordable for the health system or that replace spending on other drugs
that are more cost-effective.207 For instance, providing sofosbuvir in
203. See Emanuel, supra note 42, at 607; Neumann et al., supra note 188, at 796
(describing the use of $50,000/QALY or $100,000/QALY thresholds as the use of “an arbitrary
but convenient round number”).
204. Melanie Y. Bertram, Jeremy A. Lauer, Kees De Joncheere, Tessa Edejer, Raymond
Hutubessy, Marie-Paule Kieny & Suzanne R. Hill, Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds: Pros and
Cons, 94 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 925, 926 (2016); Raymond Hutubessy, Dan Chisholm &
Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer, Generalized Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for National-Level PrioritySetting in the Health Sector, COST EFFECTIVE RES. ALLOCATION, Dec. 2013, at 1, 8. QALYs and
DALYs are similar and interconvertible measures of health benefit. See Marthe R. Gold,
David Stevenson & Dennis G. Fryback, HALYs and QALYs and DALYs, Oh My: Similarities
and Differences in Summary Measures of Population Health, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 115,
116 (2002).
205. Bertram et al., supra note 204, at 927.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 926 (observing that “GDP-based cost-effectiveness ratios ... do not provide
information on affordability, budget impact or the feasibility of implementation”); Emanuel,
supra note 42, at 607.
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publicly funded health insurance in the United States would meet
a $100,000 per QALY threshold but would lead to an increase in
national health spending that “is probably unaffordable and more
cost-effective interventions would probably be crowded out if
sofosbuvir were to be offered on such a large scale.”208 Similarly,
recent research suggests that some drugs priced below the United
Kingdom’s reimbursement threshold lead to “the displacement of
more cost-effective activities by new approvals.”209 The use of an
opportunity cost threshold can address this problem, as discussed
in Part II.C.3 below.
2. Explicit or Implicit Valuations
Instead of being derived from income, thresholds might be
determined by looking either at individuals’ explicitly stated
preferences for health spending or at the values revealed by their
choices. Explicit preferences are typically elicited using surveys,
while revealed values are assessed by examining what society or
individuals pay to avoid risk.210 Research suggests that surveybased thresholds slightly exceed income-based thresholds, while
revealed values are more variable, with individual revealed values
typically exceeding societal ones.211
3. Opportunity Cost
Thresholds could also be set using opportunity cost: that is, at the
point where health improvements from the provision of a new drug
at the threshold price outweigh the harms to health that result from
diverting resources to pay for that drug. As one group explains,

208. Bertram et al., supra note 204, at 926; see also Emanuel, supra note 42, at 607.
209. Bertram et al., supra note 204, at 927.
210. Cf. Richard A. Hirth, Michael E. Chernew, Edward Miller, A. Mark Fendrick &
William G. Weissert, Willingness to Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a
Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 333-34 (2000).
211. See id. at 338; Emanuel, supra note 42, at 607 (“Empirical assessments of actual
health service trade-offs—that is, what a society’s spending indicates it is willing to pay per
QALY in practice—suggest a threshold of about half the per capita GDP, or $29,000 per QALY
for the US.”).

2021]

PRICING DRUGS FAIRLY

971

In theory, if all interventions could be measured in similar
terms and ranked by the favorability of their incremental costeffectiveness ratios, decision makers with a fixed budget could
maximize health gains by choosing interventions with the lowest
(most favorable) ratios and working their way down the list until
the available resources were consumed. The cost-effectiveness of
the last (least favorable) technology covered would represent
society’s willingness-to-pay threshold—the highest price society
is willing to pay for health gains.212

Other commentators agree that the method of developing a
threshold by examining opportunity cost would be theoretically
ideal if achievable.213 Opportunity cost thresholds are generally
lower than those set using income or explicit valuation.214 For
instance, a recent study concluded that the United Kingdom’s
opportunity cost threshold should be closer to £13,000 per QALY
given current budgets.215 Spending that exceeds the opportunity cost
threshold displaces other more beneficial spending, producing
additional deaths and worse health.216
While an opportunity cost threshold ensures that spending on
new drugs will never worsen health outcomes, it could underincentivize the development of treatments whose costs exceed an
opportunity cost threshold but that save money compared to
currently available alternatives. If the cost-effectiveness threshold
is understood in absolute terms (for example, $100,000 per QALY),
cost-saving treatments will sometimes exceed the threshold because
some currently available treatments cost far more than that
212. Neumann et al., supra note 188, at 796.
213. Hirth et al., supra note 210, at 333 n.* (“A theoretically sound cost/QALY standard
would reflect the shadow price (opportunity cost) of the resources devoted to obtaining one
more QALY.”); see also Bertram et al., supra note 204, at 925.
214. See Praveen Thokala, Jessica Ochalek, Ashley A. Leech & Thaison Tong, CostEffectiveness Thresholds: The Past, the Present and the Future, 36 PHARMACOECONOMICS 509,
514, 517 (2018).
215. Karl Claxton, Steve Martin, Marta Soares, Nigel Rice, Eldon Spackman, Sebastian
Hinde, Nancy Devlin, Peter C. Smith & Mark Sculpher, Methods for the Estimation of the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence Cost-Effectiveness Threshold, 19 HEALTH
TECH. ASSESSMENT, Feb. 2015, at xxx (“The central or ‘best’ threshold is estimated to be
£12,936 per QALY.”); see also Andrew Dillon, Carrying NICE over the Threshold, NICE (Feb.
19, 2015), https://www.nice.org.uk/news/blog/carrying-nice-over-the-threshold [https://perma.
cc/6NT4-PCAF] (rounding to £13,000).
216. Claxton et al., supra note 180, at 3.
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threshold.217 Replacing these costly treatments could reduce costs or
improve health, or both, even if the replacements were priced above
$100,000 per QALY, or whatever that threshold might be. Development of replacements for costly treatments could be encouraged by
permitting treatments to be priced above an absolute threshold
when they are less costly than presently provided alternatives.
While this approach would encourage socially valuable innovation,
it would also entrench existing inefficiencies because the cost of the
replacement treatments would still greatly exceed the opportunity
cost threshold, even though the new treatments would be
incrementally cost-saving compared to the status quo. An alternative strategy for incentivizing investment in cost-saving treatments
without entrenching inefficiencies would be a fixed “bounty” above
the opportunity cost threshold for treatments that replace very
costly treatments. This strategy would parallel the prize proposals
discussed earlier.218
III. IMPLEMENTING THE SOCIAL VALUE THRESHOLD: A PRICE
CEILING APPROACH
There are many options for implementing a social value threshold. As described in Part II.A, social value can be used to establish
reimbursement thresholds for single-payer or government-regulated
insurance or to establish maximum prices at which a drug may be
sold. Another option would be to use social value to determine the
prices that large governmental insurers, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, negotiate with manufacturers.219 Still another option
would be to impose an excise tax on drug manufacturers who charge
prices over the threshold.220 Each of these options requires deciding
which type of threshold discussed in Part I.B (cost, affordability,
custom, or social value) to adopt.
In this Part, I propose and defend the implementation of a social
value threshold, preferably defined using the opportunity cost
217. See Thokala et al., supra note 214, at 510, 519; Ankur Pandya, Adding CostEffectiveness to Define Low-Value Care, 319 JAMA 1977, 1977 (2018) (identifying currently
provided interventions in the United States that cost more than $150,000 per QALY).
218. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
219. NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 52-53.
220. See, e.g., Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (2019).
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approach, by means of a price ceiling. In Part III.A, I identify the
political, practical, and ethical advantages that price ceilings have
over other implementation strategies such as reimbursement limits,
excise taxes, or negotiation by governmental payers. In the following
four Sections, I address four categories of objections to price ceilings,
which I call efficiency-based, need-based, liberty-based, and desertbased objections. We can think of each category of objection as being
offered on behalf of a specific group that the price ceiling affects.
Efficiency-based objections are offered on behalf of society, particularly future generations. They raise the concern that price
ceilings will lead to underinvestment in the development of socially
valuable drugs. Need-based objections are offered on behalf of
patients who are unable to pay the maximum price that social value
considerations would justify. Conversely, liberty-based objections
are offered on behalf of patients who are interested in paying more
than the maximum price to access drugs. They contend that it is
difficult to justify limiting spending on drugs when spending on
other goods is not similarly limited. Last, desert-based objections
are offered on behalf of pharmaceutical firms. They argue that the
ingenuity required to produce pharmaceuticals merits a price above
the ceiling level. In addressing these objections, I further develop
the case in support of price ceilings.
A. Political, Practical, and Ethical Advantages
Price regulation—including the setting of maximum prices—has
existed throughout history and within a variety of economic systems
for goods including food, energy, credit, and medical services.221
While price regulation has faced vigorous criticism from modern
economic theory,222 these criticisms have not undermined its legality

221. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 735 n.35, 740-41, 756, 770-71; Regulation of
Consumer Credit, 28 FED. RSRV. BULL. 399 (1942).
222. E.g., Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 409,
409 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008) (“Despite the frequent use of price controls ... and despite
their appeal, economists are generally opposed to them, except perhaps for very brief periods
during emergencies.”); Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the
Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535, 535 (20052006) (“Law and economics loathes price controls.”).
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in the United States.223 Just as importantly, even economically
oriented scholars grant that price regulation can be appropriate in
markets, including pharmaceutical markets, in which competition
is limited.224 This Section examines some of the advantages of price
ceilings as a regulatory strategy in pharmaceutical markets.
Price ceilings, which limit the price that any buyer can be
charged, have advantages over reimbursement ceilings, which limit only the price that certain buyers will pay. A reimbursement
ceiling does not guarantee that buyers—even large buyers like
Medicare or the Veterans’ Administration—will be able to obtain
pharmaceuticals at the ceiling price. In the face of a reimbursement ceiling they judge too low, sellers could demand a higher price
while blaming buyers for refusing to pay what it takes to save
patients in need.225 This strategy could be—and indeed has been—
especially effective when coupled with pressure from patient
advocacy groups, which sellers often support with funding and
logistical coordination.226 Public insurers may capitulate due to
political pressure, while private insurers may face public opinion
headwinds.227
In contrast, a price ceiling ensures that, if a drug is available, any
buyer will be able to purchase it at the ceiling price.228 Any negative
effects of price ceilings will occur at the earlier stage of drug marketing and development decisions, when the patients who might

223. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 768 (1968) (“It is plain that the
Constitution does not forbid the imposition, in appropriate circumstances, of maximum prices
upon commercial and other activities.”).
224. E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 993, 1038 & n.230 (1990) (explaining that, even within “neoclassical ... economics,”
“[g]overnment intervention to correct market failure might be justified on economic grounds,
as in the case of price regulation of a natural monopoly”).
225. Despite Mark Pauly’s criticism of value-based price ceilings, he implicitly recognizes
that using value to set a reimbursement ceiling or negotiation target exposes the negotiator
to political pressure. See Mark V. Pauly, The Questionable Economic Case for Value-Based
Drug Pricing in Market Health Systems, 20 VALUE HEALTH 278, 281 (2017).
226. See Kyle T. Edwards, Good and Bad Patient Involvement: Implementing the PatientInvolvement Provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act at the FDA, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1077, 108284 (2019) (discussing pharmaceutical firms’ funding of patient advocacy groups).
227. See Christopher Robertson, Essay, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin
Back in the Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 927-28 (2013).
228. Troy Segal, Price Ceiling, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/p/price-ceiling.asp [https://perma.cc/3WZC-LZBN].
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benefit from a future drug are not yet identifiable.229 Price ceilings
therefore have advantages over reimbursement ceilings at addressing the problem of identifiable patients’ interests unjustifiably being
prioritized over the interests of unidentified patients, leading to
worse health outcomes.230
The use of social value to set a price ceiling, rather than a reimbursement ceiling, has particular advantages with respect to potential objections from patients. Because a price ceiling limits what
patients can be charged, rather than what insurers will pay, it
makes existing drugs more affordable to patients in the short
run,231 while its long-run effects on development incentives are
more remote and uncertain. Even if some currently existing
expensive drugs would not have been developed had the price ceiling existed at their inception, drugmakers will likely continue
manufacturing and selling them at the ceiling price because the
marginal cost of producing an already-approved drug is low.232
Unlike reimbursement limits, price ceilings will not pose the
political problem of removing access to existing drugs.233
Economic theory predicts that price regulation will reduce longrun investment in drugs whose price will be insufficient to offset
their development cost.234 But this consequence of price regulation
229. See John E. Calfee, Perspective, Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Patient Welfare,
134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1060, 1062 (2001).
230. See Claxton et al., supra note 180, at 6; cf. Calfee, supra note 229, at 1062 (observing
that, under price controls, “the beneficiaries of drugs still in development would be unaware
of the stakes and thus unable to provide a countervailing force”).
231. See Segal, supra note 228; cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation
Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 573 (2019) (arguing that better aligning a regulatory
proposal with the interests of “a well-resourced interest group” can improve political viability).
232. Cf. Rishi Gupta, TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents
in India, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 599, 610 (2004) (observing that “it would not make sense for a
firm to decide ex post, after the research and development investment had been made—a sunk
cost, in economic terms—to withdraw from” a market in the face of price controls “unless the
controlled price was below the marginal cost of production” (footnote omitted)); Calfee, supra
note 229, at 1062 (“[D]rugs would continue to be available as long as price ceilings exceeded
the costs of manufacturing and distribution, regardless of how much money had been spent
on research and development or had been lost by firms that tried and failed to develop similar
drugs.”).
233. See Marion Haas, Jane Hall, Rosalie Viney & Gisselle Gallego, Breaking Up Is Hard
to Do: Why Disinvestment in Medical Technology Is Harder than Investment, 36 AUSTL.
HEALTH REV. 148, 151 (2012) (observing that “gains from disinvestment are likely to be more
diffuse and less readily specified than any losses,” which presents political challenges).
234. See Rapp, supra note 222, at 550.
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is politically acceptable because it reframes lack of access as a
conflict between patients and profit-seeking drugmakers rather
than as a conflict between patients who need expensive drugs and
a government or insurer who is unwilling to pay what it takes to
help them. Governmental insurers, even those strongly committed
to cost-effectiveness, have frequently capitulated in such conflicts
and elected to spend more on treatments than a social value
threshold would dictate.235 Private insurers have similarly come
under pressure when attempting to cap reimbursements for costly
drugs.236 A price ceiling relieves this pressure by placing the onus on
drugmakers to explain why they have elected not to develop and
market rare disease treatments. Patient advocates could also
organize charitable investment in drug development,237 which could
enable drugs to be developed and sold at lower cost.
Effectively implementing value-based price ceilings would require
a trustworthy source of information about social value. Although
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute created by the
ACA only provides information on effectiveness, not cost-effectiveness,238 effectiveness information could be combined with pricing
data to generate reliable information about social value. Alternative
sources of information include nonprofits like the Institute for
Clinical and Economic Review239 and cost-effectiveness calculations
conducted in countries such as the United Kingdom.240 Price ceilings
would have advantages over reimbursement ceilings here as well.
They would reduce the pressure on cost-effectiveness assessors by
giving patient advocacy groups and pharmaceutical firms opposing
235. See, e.g., John Appleby, The Cancer Drugs Fund: Inequitable and Inefficient?, KING’S
FUND (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/blog/2014/09/cancer-drugs-fundinequitable-and-inefficient [https://perma.cc/3VYC-ZQCR] (describing the UK’s decision to
give cancer patients publicly subsidized access to drugs that fail to meet the UK’s “threshold
cost-effectiveness level due to a combination of low effectiveness and high cost,” and criticizing
the decision for worsening health outcomes and creating “a perverse incentive for drug
manufacturers”).
236. Pearson, supra note 160, at 306.
237. See Anne M. Readel, Finding a Cure: Incentivizing Partnerships Between Disease
Advocacy Groups and Academic Commercial Researchers, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 285, 287-88
(2013) (describing patient advocacy groups’ funding of commercial drug development).
238. See Persad, Priority Setting, supra note 152, at 132.
239. Pearson, supra note 160, at 304-05.
240. See Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 3 (discussing countries that “benchmark their
prices to UK prices”).
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incentives: pharmaceutical firms would strive to show that their
drugs have large benefits in order to be able to charge higher prices,
while patient advocates would have an incentive to challenge these
claims in order to secure lower prices.241
Price ceilings also have practical advantages over excise taxes on
expensive drugs. Because demand is highly inelastic, sellers can
simply raise prices to absorb the excise tax, rather than lowering
prices to avoid the tax or changing their drug development decisions.242 In fact, the weak negotiating position of tax-funded public
insurers such as Medicare243 means that they may end up absorbing
much of an excise tax’s burden, which means that the excise tax
merely shifts money between governmental agencies.
In addition to these political and practical advantages, price
ceilings have two types of ethical advantages. First, as Section B
will discuss, price ceilings can incentivize the development of
interventions with substantial social value, because high social
value is necessary to permit a high price. Second, as Section C will
examine, price ceilings protect society and patients from the psychological pressures and ethical burdens that access to extremely
expensive treatments can produce.
B. Addressing Efficiency-Based Objections
Outside the pharmaceutical sector, price regulation has often
been derided as economically inefficient.244 Even though no realworld market meets the conditions required for the theoretical
critique of price ceilings to succeed,245 many of these critiques are
241. Cf. Timothy Flynn, Jr., Note, On “Borrowed Wits”: A Proposed Rule for Attorney
Depositions, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1956, 1962 (1993) (discussing the argument that an
adversarial system’s “incentive structure makes it the best system for eliciting truth”).
242. See Scott Greenberg, Five Years Later: ACA’s Branded Prescription Drug Fee May
Have Contributed to Rising Drug Prices, TAX FOUND. (June 17, 2015), https://taxfoundation.
org/five-years-later-aca-s-branded-prescription-drug-fee-may-have-contributed-rising-drugprices/ [https://perma.cc/M6N7-UB4L].
243. See Ryan Knox, Note, More Prices, More Problems: Challenging Indication-Specific
Pricing as a Solution to Prescription Drug Spending in the United States, 18 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 191, 207-08 (2018).
244. See supra note 222.
245. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956-1957).
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supported by empirical evidence in markets that are reasonably
competitive, such as markets for food or housing.246 Price controls
for rental housing, for instance, tend to lead to shortages of needed
housing and to degradation in housing supply.247
When markets depart from ideal competition, however, price
controls can produce good results. In labor markets, for instance,
there is empirical support for the view that price floors (that is,
minimum wages) can assist disadvantaged workers without substantially increasing unemployment.248 When a pharmaceutical
seller enjoys a patent monopoly or market exclusivity due to the
difficulty of entry, pharmaceutical price ceilings could improve
outcomes for buyers without seriously harming the availability of
socially valuable drugs. Most other developed countries employ
either price controls or reimbursement limits based on social
value.249
Mello and Wolitz, as well as the NAM Report’s authors, worry
that price controls will reduce beneficial innovation.250 Drugmakers
have long highlighted this concern.251 But the complexity of innovation in pharmaceutical markets makes it doubtful that unrestricted monopoly pricing—which patents without price controls
enable—is either necessary or sufficient for innovation.252 More
246. See HEATH, supra note 114, at 161-62.
247. See Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent
Control, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1027, 1027 (2003) (examining the effects of rent control in New
York); HEATH, supra note 114, at 163-64.
248. See Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design
Should Incorporate Equity As Well As Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2498 n.46 (2014)
(reviewing evidence supporting the use of minimum wage laws).
249. See NAM REPORT, supra note 11, at 132-33 (observing that “enacting direct controls
or setting limits on drug prices” is “a strategy adopted by many high-income nations”).
250. Id. (“[T]his report does not recommend enacting direct controls or setting limits on
drug prices.”); Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 933 (asserting that experts believe that “crude
price controls,” such as maximum launch prices, “are undesirable from a standpoint of
preserving incentives for innovation” and that “given the widely varying investments in
research and development and anticipated market sizes for different drugs, imposing a single
statutory cap is ill-advised”).
251. See, e.g., Calfee, supra note 229, at 1063 (arguing, in an article commissioned by
pharmaceutical firms, that pharmaceutical price controls undesirably disincentivize
innovative research).
252. Cf. Rachel E. Sachs, The Uneasy Case for Patent Law, 117 MICH. L. REV. 499, 544
(2018) (observing that innovation in microbiome technology has proceeded without patent
protection).
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importantly, not all innovation is socially valuable. A social value
price ceiling disincentivizes only the development of drugs unlikely
to have sufficient social value to merit a profitable price. While an
affordability-based price ceiling is likely to discourage the development of highly beneficial drugs like sofosbuvir,253 a social value price
ceiling is not. Just as minimum wages can encourage competition on
quality rather than purely on price,254 maximum drug prices could
encourage firms to identify drugs that have large social benefits,
enabling them to recoup their costs by charging a high but justified
price or reaching a large market.255
One limitation of a price ceiling involves drugs that can be used
to treat multiple conditions. For instance, the drug aflibercept can
be used to treat both colon cancer and macular degeneration.256 Such
drugs have prompted proposals for indication-specific pricing, in
which the same drug is priced differently depending on the condition it is being used to treat, with lower prices when a drug is used
to treat conditions where it produces less benefit.257 Indicationspecific pricing could be used to generate multiple ceilings for multiple indications. But indication-specific pricing may be difficult to
maintain because of arbitrage: patients with a more serious condition will try to obtain the drug at the lower price charged to
patients with the less serious condition, which in turn lowers
253. For an argument against affordability-based pricing, see Mello & Wolitz, supra note
5, at 962.
254. See Harry G. Hutchison, Waging War on “Unemployables”? Race, Low-Wage Work, and
Minimum Wages: The New Evidence, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 55-56 (2011)
(“Minimum wage regulation is ... necessary in order to help create an environment in which
firms compete not on the basis of low pay but instead through high labour quality and product
and process innovation.”) (quoting Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Minimum Wage
Legislation, in 2 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 158 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009)).
255. Cf. Emanuel, supra note 42, at 610 (arguing that value-based pricing “might better
direct pharmaceutical innovation” and “would incentivize the development of higher-value
drugs such as antibiotics”); Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 5 (arguing that “efforts to
constrain prices by aligning them with clinical value would not stifle innovation” and that
“[t]he innovation that ‘wins’ when prices align with clinical value is the innovation that
demonstrates its ability to improve the lives of patients”).
256. STEVEN D. PEARSON, BILL DREITLEIN & CHRIS HENSHALL, INDICATION-SPECIFIC
PRICING OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 11 (2016),
https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/catalog/nlm:nlmuid-101704608-pdf [https://perma.cc/66DR7D9P].
257. Id. at 7.
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incentives for drug development below their optimal level.258
Another strategy is outcome-based pricing, in which buyers pay only
if their medical outcomes are favorable.259 An outcome-based approach would allow pricing for different indications and create
incentives to produce more effective drugs while preventing arbitrage.
Although both indication-specific and outcome-based pricing
might appear to constitute price discrimination, they can both help
to align pricing with desirable incentives. Outcome-based pricing is
particularly difficult to oppose given its resemblance to established
arrangements such as attorney contingency fees, in which clients
pay only if they receive a favorable outcome.260
C. Addressing Need-Based Objections
Need-based objections are also offered on behalf of buyers: while
efficiency-based objections argue that the social-value-based price
ceiling is too low to incentivize optimal long-term innovation, needbased objections argue that the ceiling is too high to enable shortterm access. Frederick Abbott argues that value-based pricing
unfairly prioritizes the interests of pharmaceutical firms over those
of buyers:
The pharmaceutical industry prefers that discussions about
price be based on the “value” to healthcare systems in terms of
alternatives. For example, without treatment by a new drug, a
patient would develop symptoms, visit doctors, be subject to
tests, be admitted to a hospital, become disabled, and potentially
die. The cost of hospitalization can be quite high, and the price
of hospitalization for an extended period can run into the
millions of dollars. Therefore, in “value” terms based on alternatives, even a high-priced medicine may be a “bargain.”261

258. Id. at 10.
259. See Knox, supra note 243, at 227-28; Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 5. Recent
legislation has been introduced to assist outcome-based pricing. See Press Release, supra note
104.
260. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based
Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427, 1429 (2001).
261. Abbott, supra note 51, at 303-04 (footnote omitted).
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Others offer a similar critique, arguing that a social value approach
“may not always lead to more affordable prices” because it “compares interventions to the cost of existing interventions.”262
Abbott also derides the value-based approach as “essentially a
‘hostage’ bargaining model” because
[t]he drug is under the control of the monopoly patent owner,
and the price of ransoming the drug is whatever the party
seeking to obtain it can pay. If the ransom is not paid, the
consequences may be terrible, and in that regard the ransom can
be characterized as a bargain. But it is only a bargain because
of the threat.263

Abbott’s ransom analogy goes astray in two ways. First, a valuebased price does not permit the drugmaker to charge “whatever the
party seeking to obtain [the drug] can pay”264: no drug’s price can
exceed a social value maximum. Second, the ransom analogy
presupposes an argument that needs to be supplied. Kidnappers are
appropriately described as taking “hostages” and charging a
“ransom” because their conduct is unquestionably wrongful.265 In
contrast, the wrongfulness of the patent-holder’s conduct is the
central question at issue.
Abbott also argues that value-based pricing is analogous to permitting a vendor to breach a contract after learning about a specific
customer’s willingness to pay:
Imagine a consumer preparing to board an airplane to attend an
important business meeting in a faraway city. An airline
representative says, “I am sorry but we cannot allow you to
board this flight with your current ticket. Our database research
shows that you are going to present a proposal that may lead to
a very large contract for your employer, and we do not believe
that we are being fairly compensated for our side of getting you
to your meeting. So, you can only board the aircraft if you agree
262. BERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 13; accord Lamm, supra note 80, at 968.
263. Abbott, supra note 51, at 304.
264. Id.
265. Cf. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 214-15 (1987) (proposing a moralized account of
coercion on which A coerces B by threatening to deprive B of something to which B is
entitled).
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to pay us ten times the current price of your ticket because the
value to you of getting to your meeting is much higher than
that.”
If your intuition is that this is an abusive pricing practice,
what is your intuition about a drug company that says: “You
have a fatal illness. If left untreated, you will be hospitalized for
a period of months, if not years, attended to by nursing staff and
doctors, and prescribed palliative medications. This will cost a
great deal of money, which either you or your health insurer will
pay. So, we have decided to charge you for this new medicine an
amount somewhat lower than the total cost of the treatment you
would receive if your disease were allowed to progress to its final
stage; at which point you will die. Under these circumstances, do
you not think our price fair?”266

The airline in Abbott’s example is proposing to willfully breach an
existing contract for economic gain, which could expose it to a
disgorgement remedy or other special damages.267 In contrast, there
is no contract entitling patients to pharmaceuticals. While the drug
company in Abbott’s example is proposing to profit from the
patient’s plight, the same is true for trauma surgeons and defense
attorneys.268 So it is not obvious that a value-based price becomes
abusive or unfair merely because the patient paying it is desperate.
The affordability objection can be further defused through two
complementary strategies: competition and publicly subsidized
insurance. Remember that social value does not define a specific
price to which drugmakers are entitled. Rather, it only sets a
maximum.269 When some degree of competition is possible, a lower
price than the maximum might be achieved by increasing competition. When competition does not exist, because of patent or regulatory exclusivity, prices could be lowered by reducing the length or
stringency of patent protection or of regulatory exclusivity, although
266. Abbott, supra note 51, at 304 n.112.
267. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1480-81 (2009) (discussing the Third Restatement of Restitution’s
proposal that willful breachers should be required to disgorge benefits received from breach,
and noting that “within mainstream contract law, there are various ways in which the fault
and willfulness of breach matter for the magnitude of damages”).
268. Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 921-22 (discussing the existence of extreme need
in nonpharmaceutical medical care contracts).
269. See supra Part I.B.4.
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these steps are likely to come at some detriment to socially valuable
innovation.270 Calculating the trade-off between lower prices and
reduced innovation is complex.271 This detriment to innovation must
be weighed against the improvement to short-term affordability.
What price best incentivizes socially valuable innovation is a complex empirical question. But if the prior Section’s arguments are
correct, that price will always be at or below the social value
threshold.
Meanwhile, if a given patient is unable to afford a drug that is
socially valuable at its current price, the affordability problem is
better addressed through publicly subsidized health insurance
than through trying to set a single price that every patient can
afford. Pricing based on individual affordability would generate
insufficient incentives to produce socially valuable medicines and
would create particular disincentives to produce drugs that treat
poorer patients.272
D. Addressing Liberty-Based Objections
Price ceilings apply to all buyers, irrespective of differences in
values, preferences, and ability to pay.273 This Procrustean quality
of price ceilings might prompt an objection that they unacceptably
restrict the liberty of those who wish to pay more than the ceiling
price.274 In line with this reasoning, expert panels in the European
270. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 957; see also Lamm, supra note 80, at 966.
271. Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 961 (explaining the calculation of value-based
pricing and the cost-effectiveness ratio); Sachs, supra note 252, at 544 (discussing financial
reward as a motivator for innovation and identifying the high cost of developing new drugs);
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 231, at 569-70 (arguing that exclusive IP rights may not be
necessary for some forms of innovation).
272. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 945; cf. Lemley et al., supra note 139, at 121
(discussing the “reason to worry that there is not enough investment in drugs that
disproportionately benefit the Medicaid population”).
273. Cf. Pauly, supra note 225, at 280 (“[B]ecause consumer values vary across the demand
curve, there is a distribution of value-based prices.”).
274. See, e.g., Michael Jefford, Julian Savulescu, Jacqui Thomson, Penelope Schofield,
Linda Mileshkin, Emilia Agalianos & John Zalcberg, Medical Paternalism and Expensive
Unsubsidised Drugs, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 1075, 1076 (2005) (arguing that justice “cannot
prohibit people accessing treatment they desire using their own funds unless it is unsafe” and
that “the decision of how much to spend on healthcare that is not provided by government
should be the patient’s own”); Robert M. Nelson & Theresa Drought, Justice and the Moral
Acceptability of Rationing Medical Care: The Oregon Experiment, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 97, 104
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Commission have argued that “authority to regulate prices in the
EU should extend only to those medicines purchased by, or reimbursed by, the State,” and not to “medicines not reimbursed by State
systems or medicines sold into private markets.”275 This argument
is largely accepted with respect to other essential goods: we permit
buyers to pay more than most people regard as socially optimal in
order to live in a preferred home or buy desired foodstuffs.276
In responding to the liberty objection, I will reject at the outset
three common types of responses. First, pure paternalistic arguments that buyers should not be allowed to engage in transactions
that make them objectively worse off cannot support a social value
price ceiling against the liberty objection because some buyers
might in principle be better off—not worse off—if able to purchase
drugs at a price that exceeds the social value ceiling.277 Second,
while some might wish to prohibit certain harmless transactions,
doing so is inconsistent with important commitments of a liberal
society.278 Third, “semiotic” arguments that some transactions inappropriately change the meaning of the good being exchanged,
whatever their merits elsewhere,279 are inapplicable to pharmaceutical pricing debates because exchanging money for pharmaceuticals
is acceptable—the question is whether it is acceptable to limit the
amount of money exchanged.
This Section’s case against the liberty objection instead focuses on
two other arguments. One appeals to negative externalities—
harmful effects of a private transaction on individuals other than
the buyer and seller. The other appeals to what some have called
internalities, which can justify buyers preferring a regulatory
regime that removes certain options from reach.
(1992) (“There is no compelling reason why an individual should not be allowed to use his own
private resources to purchase medical care above and beyond the established basic level of
benefits.”).
275. See Edurne Navarro Varona, The EU Pharmaceutical Sector: A Comment on Kyle, 81
ANTITRUST L.J. 37, 41 n.23 (2016).
276. See Emanuel, supra note 42, at 604.
277. See Jefford et al., supra note 274, at 1076.
278. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1974) (1859); cf. Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1215, 1227 (1997).
279. See generally Jason Brennan & Peter Martin Jaworski, Markets Without Symbolic
Limits, 125 ETHICS 1053 (2015).
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1. Externalities
As a threshold matter, negative externalities do not automatically
make a transaction apt for regulation or prohibition.280 I will focus
in this Section on two specific types of externalities that can justify
regulation. The first is covered in Part III.A: unregulated prices do
not merely permit individual buyers and sellers to freely contract for
the provision of treatments that already exist, but also create
upstream incentives for the development of new drugs—incentives
that may not be socially optimal. Some have similarly criticized
unregulated markets in other areas of health care for incentivizing
the misallocation of social resources.281
This Section also identifies an additional externality: the availability of expensive drugs that some buyers wish to purchase can
generate pressure on others to purchase those drugs. Here, expensive drugs produce a negative externality not by generating
socially counterproductive incentives but by functioning as undesired options that expose individuals to pressure.
The possibility of pressure resulting from undesirable options
suggests itself as a response to Mark Pauly’s complaint about the
“nonsensical ... response of pharmacy benefit managers and some
insurers to high launch prices for some breakthrough drugs.”282
Pauly expresses bewilderment that someone could be forced to pay
for a drug they do not value:
They seem to be asserting that the price proposed is higher than
the drug’s value, and yet they will still be “forced” somehow to
purchase the drug at that price and shift the cost to their
premium payers in an unsustainable way. The whole point of the
notion of value is that it reflects the maximum price above which
the buyer’s optimal strategy is to walk away (or somehow curtail
purchases). If a set of buyers will not walk away at a price
higher than the $100,000 per QALY price, their values must be
280. Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937,
1961 (2013) (arguing that many negative psychological externalities do not warrant
regulation: for instance, the sale of an erotic novel might produce a negative psychological
externality for a prudish third party, but this does not justify prohibiting the sale).
281. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19
ANNALS HEALTH L. 269, 287-93 (2010).
282. Pauly, supra note 225, at 280.
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greater than $100,000 per QALY, and they are irritated but not
charged more than their value.283

That the existence of an undesired option can nevertheless generate
pressure on choosers, however, is a recognized phenomenon that
supports regulation in areas ranging from kidney markets to minimum wages.284 And pressure is made more likely by two distinctive
aspects of many pharmaceuticals: that they are the sole means of
rescue for many patients, and that an equality norm applies to their
distribution.
Consider first how pharmaceuticals’ status as the sole means of
rescue might lead to choosers coming under pressure to purchase
them. People who have the ability to rescue nearby, identifiable
individuals are often regarded as morally obliged to do so, even
when rescue is costly, even though people are not morally obliged to
place themselves where individuals may be in need or to acquire the
ability to rescue.285 The development and approval of a new, expensive drug converts private or public funds into a potential means of
rescue, and thereby potentially generates new, undesired obligations.286 That access to expensive medical technologies generates a
pressure to rescue, sometimes referred to as a “technological

283. Id.
284. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Human Enhancement?
What (If Anything) Is Right with It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645, 658-59 (2014) (discussing how the
availability of enhancement technologies whose use is nominally voluntary could nonetheless
generate coercive pressures); I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical
Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1535 (2010) (explaining
that allowing workers to waive their entitlement to a minimum wage may generate pressure
to waive, which strengthens the case for a nonwaivable entitlement); SATZ, supra note 32, at
201 (discussing how, even if “allowing a market in kidneys expands a single individual’s set
of choices, if adopted in the aggregate it may reduce or change the available choices open to
others”).
285. See Vanessa Carbonell, What We Know and What We Owe, in 3 OXFORD STUDIES IN
NORMATIVE ETHICS 235, 245-55 (Mark Timmons ed., 2013) (discussing examples when one is
not obliged to acquire knowledge, but when its acquisition generates an obligation to rescue);
Thomas Pogge, Testing Our Drugs on the Poor Abroad, in EXPLOITATION AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 105, 110 (Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel eds., 2008) (discussing a
situation in which proximity to those in need generates moral obligations, even though there
is no duty to come into proximity).
286. Cf. Emanuel, supra note 42, at 605 (“High prices exploit citizens’ sense of obligation
for one another—our unwillingness to let someone suffer or die from the lack of a high-price
drug.”).
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imperative,” has been extensively discussed.287 An appendix to the
NAM report illustrates—perhaps unintentionally—the power of the
technological imperative, arguing that if “a new drug is created that
effectively treats a condition for which there never has been an
effective treatment[,] ... it is hard to imagine the federal government
or insurers telling patients or parents of affected children that the
drug will not be made available,” regardless of cost.288 The authors
of the appendix regard this scenario as providing an ethical
argument against reimbursement limits,289 but it could equally be
seen as an argument for price ceilings. Disincentivizing the production of expensive drugs at an early stage, before their potential
beneficiaries become organized and identifiable, forestalls the
technological imperative.290
In addition to being a means of rescue, pharmaceuticals also
are often subject to an equality norm: if anyone can access a drug,
everyone must be able to.291 This equal-access norm produces
political difficulties for public and private insurers who attempt
to enforce a reimbursement ceiling that denies insurance-dependent patients access to expensive drugs while permitting access
for self-pay patients.292 And it can lead to middle-class and poor
287. See, e.g., In re Doe, 37 N.Y.S.3d 401, 425 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (endorsing the claim that
“[t]he practice of medicine should not be governed by the ‘technological imperative’ [because
it exists it must be employed]” (quoting N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp. Bioethics Council, Ethics
and Clinical Practice Guided by the Family Health Care Decisions Act, 16 NYSBA HEALTH
L.J. 79, 80 (2011))); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 424
(1988) (discussing “the ‘technological imperative’—the phenomenon whereby the existence of
a technology or technique strongly inclines persons toward its use” (footnote omitted)).
288. Rosenblatt & Termeer, supra note 194, at 174.
289. See id. at 159.
290. See Albert R. Jonsen, Bentham in a Box: Technology Assessment and Health Care
Allocation, 14 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 172, 174 (1986) (arguing that “explicit evaluations
of single technologies” face the technological imperative, but a “general ... allocation policy”
does not); BRODY, supra note 29, at 212 (discussing the societal adoption of “general policies
of withholding costly interventions to save money by not providing physicians with the means
to provide those interventions”); Calfee, supra note 229, at 1062-63.
291. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Ethical and Value Issues in Insurance Coverage for Cancer
Treatment, 15 ONCOLOGIST 36, 41 (2010) (criticizing tiered prescription drug benefits under
which “[p]oorer patients who cannot afford ... copays will be denied ... drugs, while better off
patients will still obtain them, [as] an unacceptable form of ability to pay rationing”); Laura
Hercher & Anya E.R. Prince, Gene Therapy’s Field of Dreams: If You Build It, Will We Pay?,
97 N.C. L. REV. 1463, 1495 (2019) (arguing that “equality of access” is appropriate for novel,
expensive gene therapies in order to avoid “creating a world of haves and have-nots”).
292. Cf. Nelson & Drought, supra note 274, at 103 (suggesting that a refusal to “restrict an
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patients—and especially their families—feeling pressured to spend
their limited resources to purchase these drugs.293 If expensive
drugs are not available, equal-access norms will not drive spending
on them. Analogously, school uniform requirements limit options in
order to relieve equality-based pressure to purchase.294 One
ethnographic study suggests that school clothing is also subject to
an equality norm: most interviewees “were committed to assuring
that their own children would never have less than other children,
leading inevitably to ever rising stakes in clothing competition.”295
The existence of this equality norm means that permitting high
spending by some parents produces externalities for others. The
availability of costly drugs may produce similar externalities.
2. Internalities
The availability of expensive but beneficial drugs may leave
some buyers under the psychological pressure to purchase them
even when purchasing the drugs would run counter to their longterm interests. Such harms to one’s own long-term interests are

individual’s ability to purchase medical care on the open market” will lead society to “extend
the available ‘basic’ minimum of medical care to include all medically necessary procedures”
regardless of resource scarcity); Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for
Health Plans Under Healthcare Reform, 58 UCLA L. REV. 221, 234 (2010) (describing political
challenges insurers face in limiting access to treatments).
293. Cf. Robert H. Frank, Consumption Externalities and the Financing of Social Services,
in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND
LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 175, 182-84 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996), https://www.nber.org/
chapters/c6562.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FMU-W7WD] (arguing that those who “purchase more
elaborate” health insurance coverage “reduce the satisfaction of consumers who stick with the
basic plan” and that the “perception of unequal access to ‘essential’ medical services ... would
translate into irresistible political pressures to upgrade the basic plan”).
294. See Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54
BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 670 (2002).
295. Ann Bodine, School Uniforms and Discourses on Childhood, 10 CHILDHOOD 43, 54
(2003).
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sometimes referred to as “internalities.”296 And limiting one’s option set can be an effective way of preventing internalities.297
In medical research, concerns that large financial inducements
may lead research participants to take unreasonable medical risks
have prompted regulation.298 Expensive drugs present the reverse
problem: the promise of large medical benefits could lead patients
and families to take unreasonable financial risks.299 A patient may
have a long-term preference to choose lower-cost treatments in order
to preserve her, or her family’s, resources for other goals.300 But
high-cost treatments may be psychologically irresistible for patients,
even those who would reflectively prefer not to purchase them, and
even more so for family members, who may feel obliged to sacrifice
their own well-being for patients’ health.301
A final point: concerns about internalities and externalities apply
most clearly to drugs that promise—even with great uncertainty—to
rescue patients from disaster.302 One patient’s purchase of an
expensive “lifestyle drug” is less likely to generate pressure on
others to do likewise, because lifestyle drugs do not enable rescue or
296. See Lee Anne Fennell, Personalizing Precommitment, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433
(2019) (explaining that “‘internalities’ ... can cause the payoffs for the present self to diverge
from what is in an individual’s overall, long-term best interest”); cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra
note 231, at 573 (arguing that “the time-inconsistent preferences of policy makers” can justify
policymakers’ decisions to constrain their own future options in order to successfully ensure
that access to medicines is appropriately regulated).
297. Fennell, supra note 296, at 455-56.
298. See Govind Persad, Paying Patients: Legal and Ethical Dimensions, 20 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 177, 197 (2018).
299. Cf. Adrienne M. Martin, Hope and Exploitation, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 49, 54 (2008)
(arguing that some pharmaceutical firms exploit patients’ hope in order to charge them
unfairly high prices).
300. See Robert H. Frank, Commitment Problems in the Theory of Rational Choice, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1789, 1801-02 (2003).
301. See, e.g., Megan A. Stevenson & Daniel E. Abbott, Societal Responsibility and Moral
Hazard: How Much Are We Willing to Pay for Quality-Adjusted Life?, 114 J. SURGICAL
ONCOLOGY 269, 270 (2016) (“[C]ancer patients have been shown to pursue expensive therapies
regardless of price, as they often feel pressure to battle cancer ‘at all costs.’”). One scholar has
even argued that selling lifesaving drugs at exorbitant prices constitutes tortious infliction
of emotional distress. Paul J. Zwier, High Prices in the U.S. for Life-Saving Drugs: Collective
Bargaining Through Tort Law?, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 203, 233 (2016).
302. This can help explain the “paradoxical[ ]” fact that “people may feel more outrage over
high prices for lifesaving therapies ... than over incremental improvements or lifestyle drugs.”
Amy C. Madl, Note, Using Value-Agnostic Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical Innovation,
71 STAN. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2019).
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prompt demands for equal access. Patients are likewise unlikely to
feel the same degree of psychological pressure to purchase lifestyle
drugs. Lifestyle drugs appear more analogous to ordinary consumer
goods, for which unrestricted pricing is acceptable.303
E. Addressing Desert-Based Objections
As Terry Fisher and Talha Syed observe, the incentive-based
arguments for rewarding pharmaceutical companies discussed in
Part III.B are often supplemented by desert-based arguments that
“pharmaceutical firms deserve the financial returns made possible
by strong patent protection because they have invested so much
effort and money—and run such big risks—in producing their
socially valuable products.”304 Fisher and Syed ultimately endorse
one version of the desert argument, concluding “that it is only fair
that a person who expends labor in a socially valued endeavor
should receive a return commensurate with his or her effort” and
that therefore “scientists, R & D managers, and others involved in
the drug development process do deserve a fair reward for the labor
they expend in creating medicinal innovations.”305 Fisher and Syed
acknowledge that identifying what return is “commensurate” with
a given degree of effort is difficult, but they conclude that whatever
policies produce optimal innovation incentives will in practice also
provide fair rewards.306 Many commentators, including legislators,
likewise endorse the relevance of desert, even if they also often
believe current pharmaceutical prices exceed what desert can
justify.307
303. See Emanuel, supra note 42, at 604 (arguing that substantive fair pricing
considerations do not apply to restaurant meals, smartphones, or drugs for cosmetic
conditions that “are not basic necessities but luxuries”); cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 231,
at 567 (arguing that “lifestyle drugs or luxury products” are appropriate for “a user-pays
principle” rather than publicly subsidized access).
304. Fisher & Syed, supra note 91, at 668; see also id. (summarizing former PhRMA
president Gerald J. Mossinghoff’s argument that “respect for patent rights is essential both
to preserve crucial incentives for innovation and to provide the innovators the ‘rewards’ they
are due”).
305. Id. at 672-73.
306. Id.
307. See 152 CONG. REC. 18,941 (2006) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed) (“I believe the
pharmaceutical companies deserve a fair return on their investment. They have invested in
drug research and development.”); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Icelandic Pat. Off., Case
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I agree with Fisher and Syed that pharmaceutical companies
must be treated fairly, and that adequate incentive payments also
suffice for fairness.308 But their argument does not support their
conclusion. Current arrangements provide no reward for a small
firm whose hard work developing a single drug fails to produce
results, which is difficult to justify if fairness takes the form of a
“proportion between remuneration and exertion,” as Fisher and
Syed seem to believe.309 A better basis for concluding that incentive
payments suffice for fairness is the argument I offer in Part I.B.1:
that fairness to sellers should not be understood in backwardlooking terms, as the provision of a return proportionate to past
effort or sacrifice, but instead as fundamentally procedural, encompassing protection from discriminatory legislation and unjustified expropriation. Once these protections are provided, any
reward furnished by an appropriately regulated marketplace counts
as fair, including rewards whose value is diminished by price
regulation.310 Firms, including pharmaceutical firms, have no right
to reap a return on investments made or to have their commitment
to treating harmful diseases recognized with financial rewards.311
These backward-looking factors should be recognized in other ways,

E-5/17, Judgment, ¶ 35 (EFTA Court Dec. 21, 2017), http://eplaw.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/EFTA-Judgment-negative-term-SPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F2B-N33X] (“[P]harmaceutical companies should be rewarded for the efforts they put into research.”); Nancy Black,
Hard to Swallow, WHITE ROCK LAKE WKLY. (June 7, 2019), http://whiterocklakeweekly.com/
hard-to-swallow/ [https://perma.cc/5CU6-AD3L] (criticizing pharmaceutical pricing while
conceding that “[p]harmaceutical companies deserve to make money” because “[t]hey spend
lots of it researching and developing drugs to help save lives”).
308. Fisher & Syed, supra note 91, at 673.
309. Id. at 672-73 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 5-24
(William J. Ashley ed., 7th ed. 1909), https://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP.html?chapter_
num=2#book-reader [https://perma.cc/7QKB-K2SJ]).
310. Cf. Unity Real Est. Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 676 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that
businesses should not be compensated for the effects of, or excused from complying with, a
regulation on the basis that it “would be enough to destroy them as profitable enterprises”);
Reliable Wood Prods. Co. v. Fleming, 160 F.2d 548, 551 (Emer. Ct. App. 1947) (rejecting the
claim that an administrator enforcing World War II-era price controls must “establish a
maximum price which would return complainant’s costs, plus a profit,” and stating that “[t]he
regulation ... is not required to guarantee a profit to every seller”).
311. Here I agree with Anderson, supra note 144, at 270 (asserting that “markets cannot
operate efficiently unless prices are allowed to vary in response to mere luck,” and arguing
that governments should correct market outcomes to respond to need but not to accord with
judgments of desert).
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such as through prestigious scientific publications or awards, rather
than by higher prices.
A different version of the desert argument appeals to comparative
desert. The reasoning contends that because actors other than
pharmaceutical firms bear responsibility for high prices and limited
access to medicines, it is unjust to subject pharmaceutical firms to
price regulation without imposing parallel burdens on other
actors.312 This argument is also normatively unpersuasive. If price
regulation can improve health outcomes, it should not be rejected on
underinclusiveness grounds.313
IV. SURMOUNTING LEGAL OBSTACLES
In this Part, I discuss potential legal obstacles to the implementation of a price ceiling grounded in social value. The first two
obstacles I discuss, patent preemption and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, are applicable only to the use of price ceilings at the state
level, while the other two challenges would also apply at a federal
level. While the implementation of a price ceiling at the federal level
would preclude some legal challenges,314 it would require surmounting congressional gridlock.
At the outset, price ceilings have an important advantage over
reimbursement limits because they can improve access to socially
valuable drugs, in both the short term (by lowering prices) and the
long term (by changing incentives), without requiring revisions to
the rules of large governmental insurers, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, or to state laws mandating insurance benefits or constraining private insurers’ ability to deny coverage for costly procedures. Medicare is currently constrained from refusing coverage

312. See Govind Persad, Examining Pharmaceutical Exceptionalism: Intellectual Property,
Practical Expediency, and Global Health, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 157, 188 &
n.127 (2019) (discussing these arguments). Similar arguments have been levied against other
price regulations. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing defendant for unfairly “using the
occasion of rent regulation ... to establish a welfare program privately funded by those
landlords who happen to have ‘hardship’ tenants”).
313. See Persad, supra note 312, at 188-89; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
314. See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 953-54.
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on cost-effectiveness grounds,315 and a recent attempt by Massachusetts’s Medicaid program to use cost-effectiveness criteria to exclude
coverage for certain drugs was rejected by the federal agency
administering the program.316 States also constrain the private
sector’s ability to limit reimbursements by mandating a variety of
insurance benefits317 and by subjecting insurers’ coverage determinations to external review that is often hostile to cost-effectiveness.318
A. Patent Preemption
Patent Act preemption could obstruct the use of a price ceiling at
the state level. During the early 2000s, the District of Columbia
attempted to enforce price controls on certain patented pharmaceuticals; the Federal Circuit eventually struck down these
regulations as preempted by federal patent law.319 Although the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, many have argued that the
Federal Circuit’s reasoning was dubious because the Patent Act
does not entitle patentholders to specific or unregulated profits.320
Even under the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, however, a price
ceiling will pass muster if it covers both patented and nonpatented
315. See Pearson et al., supra note 29, at 1-2 (explaining that Medicare does not consider
prices when making coverage determinations, and that “Medicare’s permissiveness sets an
implicit standard for all insurers”); Lemley et al., supra note 139, at 84-87.
316. See Chris Kukka & Johanna Butler, Feds Send Mixed Responses on States’ Efforts to
Control Medicaid Drug Costs, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (July 10, 2018),
https://nashp.org/feds-send-mixed-responses-on-states-efforts-to-control-medicaid-drug-costs/
[https://perma.cc/6FVH-CWBQ]. Massachusetts’s proposal prompted vigorous pushback from
pharmaceutical firms and patient advocacy groups. See Comments Received for MA 1115 June
2017 Amendment Application Demonstration, MEDICAID.GOV, https://1115publiccomments.
medicaid.gov/results/public/bWVkaWNhaWRmZWRyYW1wMTExNS1VUl84Q2t0WG9QY
mhrQkRJVmYtNWU0NDYwYTFiNDQzMDkwMDExMDcwMGY5#/pages/Page_21b522337087-4437-98e4-0511887cf7d8 [https://perma.cc/MJ2P-FXJ9].
317. See Mantel, supra note 292, at 236-37; Robertson, supra note 227, at 938.
318. See Robertson, supra note 227, at 938.
319. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1371-74 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
320. See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and
the New Need to Eliminate Federal Patent Law Preemption of State and Local Price and
Product Regulation, 2007 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 30, 33; see also Mello & Wolitz, supra note
5, at 877 (“[M]uch about this ruling invites further inquiry, if not skepticism.”).
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drugs and does not treat the two differently.321 In this respect,
commentators err when they claim that the Federal Circuit’s
“decision appears to foreclose state efforts to regulate the prices at
which patented medications may be sold,”322 and that only Congress,
not the states, can set a maximum price for drugs.323 A price ceiling
on all drugs—patented and unpatented alike—would operate
analogously to a tax or generally applicable economic regulation,
such as a permit requirement or environmental offset fee. Such
regulations have never been held to violate the Patent Act, even
when they apply to patented as well as unpatented goods.324
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
More recently, in Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh,
Maryland’s drug price regulation was struck down for excessively
trenching on federal power.325 In this case, the vehicle for federal
supremacy was the Commerce Clause rather than the Patent Act.326
In an application of the judge-made “Dormant Commerce Clause”
doctrine, a panel of the Fourth Circuit ruled that Maryland’s price
regulation violated the Commerce Clause because of its effects on
out-of-state pharmaceutical transactions.327 The state statute at
issue prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesale
distributors from engaging in “price gouging,” defined as “an
unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription drug,” with
respect to certain essential medicines.328 Unconscionable increases,
in turn, are defined as increases that are “excessive and not justified
321. See Feldman et al., supra note 5, at 48-49 (explaining that the Federal Circuit’s
decision was dependent on the fact that D.C.’s pricing provisions applied only to patented
drugs).
322. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 877; cf. Brendan Murphy, Note, Getting High on
Profits: An Analysis of Current State and Federal Proposals to Rein in Soaring Drug Prices,
12 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 37, 87 (2016) (“[I]f a legislative act diminishes the economic
reward to patent holders by setting a maximum allowable price, it will be deemed preempted
by the Patent Act.”).
323. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 933 (“Congress (but not the states, given patent
preemption issues) could establish a statutory maximum launch price.”).
324. See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 12.
325. 887 F.3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
326. Id. at 667.
327. Id. at 665, 674.
328. Id. at 666 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-801(c) (2017)).
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by the cost of produc[tion].”329 The Fourth Circuit invalidated the
statute on the basis that it applied to, and dictated prices in,
wholesale drug transactions that might occur entirely out of state.330
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is unconvincing in several
respects. In particular, its argument that Maryland’s statute “sets
prescription drug prices in a way that ‘interfere[s] with the natural
function of the interstate market’ by superseding market forces that
dictate the price of a good”331 is specious because prescription drug
markets deviate substantially from classically competitive markets.332 The dissenting opinion also criticizes the majority for ignoring the fact that the Maryland statute does not favor in-state
over out-of-state economic interests—the core concern animating
modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence—and does not
affect transactions that generate no sales of drugs in Maryland.333
Even under the framework adopted in the Fourth Circuit’s
majority opinion, a social value price ceiling would not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. A social value price ceiling does not tie
maximum prices to the prices charged in other states and need not
apply to out-of-state sales.334 State price regulations that do not tie
329. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-801(f)).
330. Id. at 671-72.
331. Id. at 673 (alteration in original) (quoting McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 235
(2013)).
332. See supra Part I.A.2.
333. Ass’n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 680 (Wynn, J., dissenting). Given the political
dimensions of drug pricing, it is noteworthy that the dissent identified an opinion by nowJustice Gorsuch that construed the Dormant Commerce Clause narrowly, id. at 681 (citing
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.)), and
that both Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia rejected the Dormant Commerce Clause,
see Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1811 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (referring to prior dissents); id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
“negative Commerce Clause” as “a judicial fraud”).
334. See Epel, 793 F.3d at 1171, 1173 (explaining that the price controls invalidated on
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds, in the absence of clearly excessive burdens on interstate
commerce or clear discrimination against out-of-staters, have involved three elements: “(1)
a price control or price affirmation regulation, (2) linking in-state prices to those charged
elsewhere, with (3) the effect of raising costs for out-of-state consumers or rival businesses”);
cf. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh:
The Supreme Court Allows the States to Proceed with Expanding Access to Drugs, 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 69, 80, 84 (2004) (observing that a statute upheld against a
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge “neither attempted to regulate prices of out-of-state
transactions nor favored Maine manufacturers to the disadvantage of out-of-state
competitors,” and that the “ruling remove[d] one important drug industry argument in
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in-state to out-of-state prices, do not regulate out-of-state conduct,
and do not disfavor merchants based on their out-of-state status
have typically survived Dormant Commerce Clause challenges.335
C. Takings
Pharmaceutical vendors contend that price ceilings are regulatory
takings of their property that entitle them to compensation. This
argument is the legal translation of the desert-based objection
discussed in Part III.E: the price ceiling prevents drugmakers from
reaping their deserved rewards. Earlier, some argued that price
controls on medical services were takings.336 These arguments were
unsuccessful in court.337 Even courts normatively sympathetic to the
desert-based objection to price controls have hesitated to grant it
legal bite.338 Instead, courts concluded that because medical service
providers can respond to the disincentivizing effects of price
controls, they are not subject to a taking.339 And even a takings

opposing state drug price regulation programs”).
335. See, e.g., Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 F.3d 1302, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 2008)
(upholding interest rate regulations on payday loans that did not apply to out-of-state
transactions and did not tie the regulations to rates charged in other states); Lotus Bus. Grp.
v. Flying J Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (concluding that price regulation
survive[d] Dormant Commerce Clause challenge because of lack of evidence that it
“discriminates against out-of-state interests or [was] excessively burdensome on interstate
commerce”).
336. See Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits on Physician Price Controls, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635, 639-40 (1994); William S. Brewbaker III, Health Care Price
Controls and the Takings Clause, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 669, 671 (1994).
337. See, e.g., Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1993); Minn. Ass’n of
Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 446-47 (8th Cir.
1984).
338. See Garelick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“If the Court were
writing on a clean slate, ... [the providers’] argument might have considerable logical force.”),
aff’d, 987 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1993).
339. See id. at 113 (observing that providers “have the option of practicing outside of
hospitals, and may even be able to practice in hospitals and still decline to serve Medicare
patients”); accord Minn. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, 742 F.2d at 446 (upholding price
regulation on nursing homes because “Minnesota nursing homes ... have freedom to decide
whether to remain in business and thus subject themselves voluntarily to the limits imposed
by Minnesota on the return they obtain from investment of their assets in nursing home
operation”).
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framework would still require sellers to show that the ceiling price
inadequately compensated them.340
D. Freedom of Contract
More speculatively, buyers could bring a due process challenge to
price ceilings in the spirit of Eugene Volokh’s “medical self-defense”
argument—that they have a constitutional due process right to
purchase drugs to protect themselves from disease.341 This argument is the legal analogue of the liberty argument discussed in Part
III.D. Volokh deploys this argument in defense of a right to access
various medical interventions without regulatory limits, including
unapproved drugs and transplantable organs.342 Although the D.C.
Circuit rejected an analogue of Volokh’s argument for access to
unapproved drugs,343 economic due process arguments could become
more than an academic curiosity. Academic commentators, and even
some recently appointed federal judges, have signaled an interest in
reviving Lochner-era approaches to economic substantive due
process.344 An effort to pay an unregulated price to access a potentially lifesaving drug could present an emotionally compelling
factual situation that might motivate advocates to seek out a
sympathetic judge.
The practical effects of a price ceiling, however, may make it
unlikely to raise due process concerns. A price ceiling is unlikely to
limit patients’ access to existing drugs because most can be
produced and distributed at little marginal cost.345 Rather, a price
ceiling shifts incentives for future drug development.346 Because a
price ceiling is more likely to change future incentives than impede
340. See Garelick, 784 F. Supp. at 114.
341. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1828, 1831-32 (2007).
342. Id. at 1828-30, 1835-37.
343. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 710-11, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
344. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 531 (2015); Edith Roberts, Potential Nominee Profile: Don Willett, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 29, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/potential-nominee-profile-donwillett/ [https://perma.cc/CJ3Q-EF6E].
345. See Calfee, supra note 229, at 1062.
346. Id. at 1062-63.
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present access, patients will struggle to show that price ceilings
interfere with their right of self-protection against disease. Patient
advocacy groups may likewise be uninterested in challenging price
ceilings if they can obtain drugs at the ceiling price. A due process
challenge could also be avoided by replacing price ceilings with
excise taxes or allowing payers to cap reimbursements, while
leaving prices themselves unregulated.347 But, as discussed above,
a price ceiling has both practical and legal advantages over these
alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Pharmaceutical pricing remains among the hardest problems in
health law and policy.348 This Article furthers discussion around
drug pricing by elucidating and categorizing disparate definitions of
fair pricing that are often unexplored or taken for granted in
existing debates. It then argues that fair prices should be defined by
reference to social value and examines how social value might be
defined and a social value threshold established. Last, it describes
how a price ceiling could be used to implement a social value threshold, and how such a price ceiling could effectively respond to
normative objections and withstand legal challenges. Price ceilings
have historically been recognized as politically resilient but
criticized for producing bad outcomes,349 while the use of social value
criteria in pharmaceutical policy has been praised for improving
outcomes but has often proven legally and politically vulnerable.350
A pharmaceutical price ceiling based on social value can combine
the best qualities of its parents, successfully improving outcomes
while weathering practical challenges.

347. Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 5, at 883 (“This approach does not restrict drug prices
per se, but rather sets an upper limit on the amount that specified drug purchasers in the
state will pay.”).
348. See Mello, supra note 109, at 2277-78.
349. See supra Part III.A.
350. See supra Part IV.

